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ANYTHING BUT AUTOMATIC: DISMISSAL UNDER § 521
INTRODUCTION

Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), bankruptcy cases are dismissed more often
for apparent violations of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”). These dismissal
decisions under BAPCPA are being rendered at an increasing rate. Despite the
commonality of dismissal decisions, the opinions justifying them tend to range
from a strict interpretation of the alleged plain language of the Bankruptcy
Code to judgments creating new tests and various loopholes in interpretation.
The main purpose of the Code is to provide a procedure by which honest
consumers are entitled to a discharge of debts and a fresh start.1 Through
bankruptcy, honest debtors can “reorder their affairs, make peace with their
creditors, and enjoy ‘a new opportunity in life’”2 without having to worry
about the encumbrances and restrictions of their past obligations.3 The Code is
designed to restrict such opportunity to the “honest but unfortunate debtor”4
and weed out debtors who file in bad faith. However, this raises an important
question: what happens when a dishonest debtor seeks to take advantage of the
Bankruptcy Code and uses provisions meant to protect honest debtors and
creditors to his own unfair advantage?
This Comment will look at how a narrow reading of § 521(i) leads to an
automatic dismissal which encourages abuse of the bankruptcy system by
dishonest debtors.5 While a strict and rigid application of § 521(i) requirements
allows dishonest debtors to manipulate the system, it also leads to unfavorable
outcomes for honest debtors. If any documents or information have not been
filed in a timely manner, then a bankruptcy case may be dismissed
automatically. Although there are several solutions, including the promotion of
1 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S.
279, 286–87 (1991) (“The principal purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest
but unfortunate debtor.’”)).
2 Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286.
3 Id.; Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (“[The] purpose of the [bankruptcy] act has
been . . . [to give] to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he
owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.”).
4 Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367; Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244.
5 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i) (2006).
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judicial discretion and the use of waiver forms, this Comment suggests an
amendment to the Code that will promote fairer results for debtors.
An example will illustrate how dishonest debtors can abuse the Code.
Imagine that Blake, an orthopedic surgeon, had to declare bankruptcy since
neither his personal practice nor his investments were doing as well as he had
hoped. His creditors pursued him for months without avail, while he continued
to ignore them. Seeing no end in sight and in dire need of the automatic stay,
Blake filed for chapter 7. His scheduled assets indicated a home in Sandy
Springs, Georgia (valued at $2,500,000), a 2010 Jeep Wrangler (valued at
$35,000), and other minor assets. Unknown to the chapter 7 trustee, fifty days
before filing Blake conveyed virtually all his interest in another home (valued
at $1,500,000) and a 2011 Maserati GranTurismo MC Stradale (valued at
$205,000) to a corporate entity named Canttouchthis, Inc., which he controlled.
Blake did not notify his creditors or obtain court authorization.
Notwithstanding Blake’s efforts, the chapter 7 trustee eventually found out
about the hidden assets. As a result, Blake amended the schedules to include
the newly found property and proposed a new plan. Blake, seeing that he
would not be able to keep his prized possessions, did not agree with the plan
and moved for an order dismissing his case for failure to file a complete
statement of monthly net income, as required by § 521. Using § 521 to his
advantage, Blake intentionally failed to file a complete statement since he
wanted to make sure he could get out of the bankruptcy proceedings if things
were not going his way. After waiting forty-five days without providing all the
necessary information, the court would have no other choice but to order
dismissal. After enough time had passed, Blake again filed for chapter 7. This
time his prized possessions were out of the trustee’s reach. The creditors were
left with only a partial repayment of his debt while the cunning Blake was able
to keep his highly valued assets.
On the other hand, the same provision can work painfully against honest
debtors. Imagine Emma, a single mother who has been burdened by numerous
bills, child support, and a recent layoff from work. She has been living
paycheck to paycheck, and the current economic slump has not helped her
situation. Harassed by debt collectors every day and barely able to feed her
children, she decides to file for chapter 7 to get a fresh start through
bankruptcy. She attempted to compile all the necessary information as advised
by her attorney, but unfortunately her employer could not provide pay stubs for
the last week of her employment because a fire destroyed the business. Since
her paycheck was the same amount every week, her attorney extrapolated the
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information for the last pay stub and provided it to the court. A few months
after filing, a creditor asked the court to provide an order stating that the case
has been automatically dismissed after forty-five days since Emma did not
provide all the information required by § 521. Emma’s failure to provide the
last pay stub from her employer did not meet the requirements of § 521 and her
case was automatically dismissed on the forty-sixth day despite her honest
need for bankruptcy protection. Emma was an honest but unfortunate debtor
who filed her information in good faith but was denied bankruptcy relief
because of a minor technicality.
The two anecdotes illustrate how a rigid application of § 521(i)
requirements can lead to unfavorable outcomes for honest debtors and allow
dishonest debtors to manipulate the system. The Comment will first introduce
the legislative reasoning for the changes provided by BAPCPA and how § 521
plays a role within the new act. Second, this Comment will look at how the
majority of bankruptcy courts have interpreted § 521’s provisions after
acknowledging that the provisions curtail judicial discretion. An analysis of the
textualist approach to § 521 will follow. Limiting the bankruptcy court’s
discretionary authority in § 521(a)(1) encourages bankruptcy abuse. Without
discretionary authority, bankruptcy courts cannot prevent an abusive and
manipulative debtor from having his case automatically dismissed when he
intentionally fails to comply with the § 521(a)(1) filing requirements.6
Finally, this Comment will examine the approach of a minority of
bankruptcy courts, led by a limited number of circuit courts, that have
attempted to discourage bankruptcy abuse by establishing the discretion
necessary to waive the § 521(a)(1) filing requirement, even after the filing
deadline has passed.7 Using its discretionary authority, these courts declined to
dismiss the debtor’s case where the court determined that the debtor was
abusing and manipulating the bankruptcy system.8 Similarly, these courts also
refused to dismiss honest debtor’s cases where dismissal would go against the
best interests of the debtor and the overall bankruptcy system.9 Their approach
rests on the idea that because § 521(i) lacks a single plain meaning, the use of
judicial discretionary authority in interpreting it can reduce manipulation of the
6

See Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren), 568 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009).
See id.; Segarra-Miranda v. Acosta-Rivera (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2009); Miller
v. Cameron (In re Miller), 383 B.R. 767, 772 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008); In re Parker, 351 B.R. 790, 802 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 2006).
8 In re Warren, 568 F.3d at 1119; In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d at 14.
9 See In re Miller, 383 B.R. at 772; In re Parker, 351 B.R. at 801.
7
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bankruptcy process, protect the interests of honest debtors, and in doing so
further the goals of BAPCPA.
I. BACKGROUND
A. BAPCPA and Its Attempt to Curb Bankruptcy Abuse
Section 521 was significantly changed by BAPCPA in order to curb
bankruptcy abuse.10 Congress had specific concerns that it wanted to address
and it did so through the act.11 The Comment will examine the legislative
history to better understand the congressional intent behind BAPCPA. Section
521 was restructured to reflect these intentions, and the Comment will analyze
each section in greater detail to see what effect it may have on bankruptcy.12
In enacting BAPCPA, Congress sought to deliver an all-inclusive package
applicable to both consumer and business bankruptcy cases.13 As Congress
stated, “The purpose of the bill is to improve bankruptcy law and practice by
restoring personal responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and
ensure that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors.”14 Many of the
reforms that were proposed and enacted included “provisions [that were]
intended to deter serial and abusive bankruptcy filings.”15 Indeed, Congress
passed BAPCPA in response to growing concerns of abuse of bankruptcy
procedures by dishonest debtors.16 Thus, BAPCPA is scattered with creditorfriendly language to remedy a perceived imbalance in the Bankruptcy Code
favoring debtors.17
1. Congressional Intent
BAPCPA was enacted by broad bipartisan majorities in both houses of
Congress.18 In support of creditor interests, BAPCPA was meant to “respond to
many of the factors contributing to the increase in consumer bankruptcy

10

See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
See id. at 1.
12 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2006).
13 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 1.
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See id.
17 See In re Ott, 343 B.R. 264, 266 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006). See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23.
18 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2.
11
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filings, such as lack of personal financial accountability, the proliferation of
serial filings, and the absence of effective oversight to eliminate abuse in the
system.”19 Four primary factors generated and supported the need for
bankruptcy reform. First, Congress was concerned with the number of yearly
bankruptcy filings and thus believed that bankruptcy relief was too readily
available.20 Second, due to the increase in bankruptcy filings, significant
economic losses resulted in negative pressure on responsible consumers.21
Third, Congress recognized that the Code had various loopholes and incentives
that encouraged opportunistic bankruptcy filings, which resulted in abuse of
the bankruptcy system by dishonest debtors.22 Lastly, no clear mandate
required debtors who were able to repay a significant portion of their debts to
do so.23
The first factor in motivating comprehensive reform was Congress’s
concern that the number of bankruptcy filings “nearly doubled to more than 1.6
million cases filed in fiscal year 2004.”24 Congress was worried that there was
a “growing perception that bankruptcy relief may be too readily available and
is sometimes used as a first resort, rather than a last resort.”25 However, others
point out that the alleged abuse of the system is not as extensive as Congress
believed it to be. Some scholars argue that the increase in bankruptcy filings is
mainly due to sudden tragedy, such as divorce, illness, or unemployment.26 In
addition, some consumers have increased their debt loads over the past thirty
years because lenders are more lenient in their lending policies.27 Susan BlockLieb and Edward J. Janger state that “[t]he demise of usury laws and the
development of national credit reporting and credit scoring systems and mass
marketing techniques permitted lenders to create a national market for
consumer credit available to even the least credit-worthy members of society—

19

Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
21 Id. at 2–3.
22 Id. at 3.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 4.
25 Id. at 2.
26 See id.; Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality,
Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1488 (2006) (arguing
that the credit industries—not opportunistic debtors who abuse the bankruptcy system—are responsible for the
increase in bankruptcy filings); Jean Braucher, Theories of Overindebtedness: Interaction of Structure and
Culture, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 323, 332 (2006) (“Families are driven to borrow more after job loss,
divorce or illness . . . .”).
27 Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 26, at 1563; see also H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2.
20
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at a price.”28As a result, before BAPCPA, any damage done to consumers by
over-borrowing was offset somewhat by filing for bankruptcy.29Academics and
researchers insist that the focus of BAPCPA should have been on consumer
protection rather than on bankruptcy reform in response to the increase in
bankruptcy filings.30 Despite these conflicting views, Congress nevertheless
thought that reform was necessary.31
Second, significant economic losses were associated with bankruptcy
filings. Todd Zywicki explained that, when creditors are unable to collect debts
because of dishonest bankruptcy proceedings, those losses are passed down as
a hidden “bankruptcy tax” onto responsible Americans.32 Congress also noted
that, in 2002 alone, the credit card industry lost $18.9 billion from consumer
bankruptcy filings, an increase of 15.1% over the previous year.33
The third factor in support of bankruptcy reform was that “the present
bankruptcy system ha[d] loopholes and incentives that allow[ed] and—
sometimes—even encourage[d] opportunistic personal filings and abuse.”34
The U.S. Trustee Program35 identified multiple problems such as debtor and
attorney misconduct, debtor abuse, and other problems associated with
bankruptcy petitions.36 Congress particularly wanted to curtail these problems
in the bankruptcy system.
Fourth, Congress was concerned about the high number of debtors filing
for bankruptcy and stated that “some bankruptcy debtors are able to repay a
significant portion of their debts.”37 However, Congress acknowledged that
there was no clear mandate that required the debtors to repay their debts.38
These four primary factors led to a congressional effort to “restor[e] personal

28

Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 26, at 1565.
Id.
30 Id. at 1491.
31 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2.
32 Id. at 3. Congress explained that in 1997, “$44 billion of debt was discharged by debtors who filed for
bankruptcy relief” and that this loss “translate[d] to a $400 annual ‘tax’ on every household” in America. Id.;
see also Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing on S. 256 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 13 (2005)
(testimony of Todd Zywicki, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center).
33 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 3.
34 Id.
35 The U.S. Trustee Program is part of the Justice Department charged with administrative oversight of
bankruptcy cases.
36 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 3.
37 Id.
38 Id.
29
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responsibility and integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure that the
system is fair for both debtors and creditors.”39
Although Congress had strong motivations for enacting BAPCPA, it was
not a perfectly written statute. BAPCPA’s many contradictions and
inconsistencies caused bankruptcy judges to sometimes exercise discretion in
interpreting its provisions. For example, courts are split in terms of interpreting
whether an absolute right to automatic dismissal exists or whether the courts
can “order otherwise.”40 Some courts blame this split in the interpretations of
BAPCPA to the fact that it is a “poorly written statute.”41 Commentators have
noted that “[t]here are typos, sloppy choices of words, hanging paragraphs, and
inconsistencies. Worse, there are largely pointless but burdensome new
requirements, overlapping layers of screening, mounds of new paperwork, and
structural incoherence.”42 This may be due to the fact that lobbyists with
limited knowledge of real-life consumer bankruptcy practice, instead of
bankruptcy professionals, drafted these provisions.43 Although the drafters
intended to limit judicial discretion, “the bill’s poor drafting will require judges
to exercise their judgment simply in trying to determine what it means.”44
2. Judicial Discretion
BAPCPA also had a significant effect on judicial discretion, especially
when implementing § 521 provisions. Congress intended BAPCPA to limit
judicial discretion to encourage reliance on the plain language of the Code’s
provisions.45 Before BAPCPA, the courts had more discretionary power when

39

Id. at 1.
Compare In re Lopez, No. 09-31511-C, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3029, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Sept. 17,
2009), with Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren), 568 F.3d 1113, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2009), Segarra-Miranda v.
Acosta-Rivera (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2009), In re Withers, No. 06-42098 TM, 2007
WL 628078, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2007), and In re Parker, 351 B.R. 790, 802 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
2006).
41 See Fokkena v. Hartwick, 373 B.R. 645, 652–53 (D. Minn. 2007).
42 Jean Braucher, The Challenge to the Bench and Bar Presented by the 2005 Bankruptcy Act: Resistance
Need Not Be Futile, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 93, 97.
43 Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing Consumers Under the
“Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005,” 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 191, 191–92
(2005) (noting that bankruptcy experts drafted previous amendments to title 11 and that BAPCPA drafters
refused to make technical corrections to the statute).
44 Id. at 192–93 (noting that intent to limit judicial discretion existed and that the requirement of more
judicial discretion will be necessary).
45 Musselman v. eCast Settlement Corp. (In re Musselman), 394 B.R. 801, 812 (E.D.N.C. 2008); see also
Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13
40
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deciding whether to punish debtors who engaged in prebankruptcy exemption
planning.46 Due to the courts’ discretionary powers, inconsistencies arose
between courts when trying to identify prohibited prebankruptcy planning.47
As a result, Congress attempted to limit such discretion through BAPCPA.48
Therefore, in enacting BAPCPA, Congress had more than one policy goal
in mind. The two main goals of BAPCPA were to preserve bankruptcy relief
for those who need it and reduce fraud and abuse of the bankruptcy system by
those who do not.49 However, Congress also sought to streamline the judicial
process by providing clear and defined standards.50 Congress has been adamant
about establishing definite rules rather than leaving something up to judicial
discretion.51 This may be due to the fact that bankruptcy judges are perceived
in a different light than other judges.52 As one legal scholar wrote, “It is no
secret that the bills’ proponents sought to limit the discretion of bankruptcy
judges who, according to them, are ‘not real judges.’”53 Thus, Congress sought
to impose objective, standard bankruptcy determinations by removing some
judicial flexibility in bankruptcy cases.54 As one scholar put it, “Eliminating
flexibility was the point: the obligations of chapter 13 debtors would be subject
to ‘clear, defined standards,’ no longer left ‘to the whim of a judicial
proceeding.’”55
3. Section 521 of the Bankruptcy Code
In order to get a better understanding of § 521, how it affects debtors and
bankruptcy courts, and how the goals of BAPCPA are achieved through it, it is
best to look at how § 521 has evolved. Over time, § 521 became more complex
and multifaceted, especially after the BAPCPA amendments. Due to its
complexity, some of the language became ambiguous and confusing. Although
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 679–80 (2005) (arguing that Congress intended to reduce judicial discretion
rather than provide bankruptcy courts with more leeway and discretion).
46 Juliet M. Moringiello, Has Congress Slimmed Down the Hogs?: A Look at the BAPCPA Approach to
Pre-Bankruptcy Planning, 15 WIDENER L.J. 615, 629 (2006).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 1 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
50 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2–3.
51 See Sommer, supra note 43, at 192–93.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Musselman v. eCast Settlement Corp. (In re Musselman), 394 B.R. 801, 812 (E.D.N.C. 2008).
55 Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 527 (2005).
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Congress wanted § 521 to be mechanical in its application, the statute as
interpreted left many questions unanswered and seemed to create loopholes. In
the end, while the statute addresses some of BAPCPA’s concerns, it does so in
a muddled manner.
In general, § 521 of the Code enumerates debtors’ duties in a bankruptcy
case.56 It applies to all cases under the Code regardless of the chapter under
which the debtor’s petition is filed.57 Some of these duties apply to all debtors,
while others are specific to certain chapters of the Code and certain types of
debtors. In addition, certain parts of § 521 apply to individual chapter 7 debtors
who have property securing consumer debts,58 while other parts of the section
apply to trustees serving in the case.59
While § 521 is largely derived from § 7 of the former 1898 Bankruptcy
Act, it has been amended several times. Most of the changes were “intended to
speed up and improve the administration of bankruptcy and to clarify the
language of the various provisions.”60 One of the most significant changes
came in 2005 through BAPCPA when § 521 was amended to add new
requirements and deadlines for documentation.61 These amendments changed
the scope and extent of § 521 in an attempt to make the process more
mechanical and streamlined while at the same time trying to prevent abuse of
the bankruptcy proceedings. Of particular note is the slightly perplexing
subsection (i). Subsection (i) requires the court to automatically dismiss a case
if information required by § 521(a)(1) is not timely filed with the Court.62
Section 521 works with other Code sections that impose duties on debtors.
These other closely related sections also explain a debtor’s duties. For
example, additional duties are found in § 343, in which the debtor must submit
to an examination at the meeting of creditors.63 “If the debtor should conceal or
fraudulently convey assets, make a false oath, falsify financial records or
56

See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2006).
Id. § 103(a).
58 Id. § 521(a)(2).
59 Id. § 521(a)(3), (4).
60 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 521.LH (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2011).
61 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, PUB. L. NO. 109-8, 119 Stat.
23. As part of the amendments, some of the changes included: redesignation of subsections (1) through (5) as
subsections (a)(1) through (a)(5); an addition of documents to be filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1); and under
(a)(2), the time period for filing the statement of intention regarding secured debt was changed. In addition,
subsections (b) through (j) were added to § 521. See id.
62 See id.
63 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 60, ¶ 521.02.
57
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fraudulently make a false declaration, verification, or statement under penalty
of perjury, the debtor may not receive a discharge and may be subject to
prosecution under [§] 152 of title 18.”64 In contrast to the harsh penalties faced
by debtors in violation of § 343, the penalties of discharge under § 521 are
minimal, and in some cases there are no penalties.65 Thus, although the duties
created by § 521 are important, failure to abide by them results in dismissal
rather than prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 152.66
Despite congressional intent, the current § 521(i) is neither simple nor
mechanical.67 Rather, it is full of intertwining procedures, possibilities for
motions, unclear timing rules, and non-ministerial judgments.68 For example,
under § 521(i), the debtor’s case is “automatically dismissed” if the debtor
does not file the required documents, as prescribed by § 521(a)(1), within
forty-five days of petition.69 No judicial act is necessary and simply the
passage of time may result in a dismissal of the case.70 However, § 521(i)(2)
provides that if a case is dismissed under such circumstances, then it will be
dismissed by an order of the court on request of a party-in-interest.71 This
provision intends to remedy “instances where business debtors would operate
as debtors in possession for many months without filing schedules and
financial affairs, relying on multiple extensions of time from the court.”72
Understandably, courts have struggled to make sense of these contradicting
provisions as to whether dismissal is automatic or whether it requires an order
of the court.73 To better understand the difficulties of implementing § 521(i),
this Comment will now examine each of its subsections to determine how they
relate to each other and to § 521(a)(1).74
64

Id.
Id.
66 See 18 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).
67 Keith M. Lundin, Automatic Dismissal Under § 521(i) After BAPCPA: Much Danger Ahead, NORTON
BANKR. L. ADVISER, Nov. 2005, at 15, 16.
68 Id.
69 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2006).
70 See In re Parker, 351 B.R. 790, 801 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).
71 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(2); In re Parker, 351 B.R. at 801.
72 3 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3D
§ 55:4 (2011).
73 See Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren), 568 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009); Segarra-Miranda v.
Acosta-Rivera (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2009); Miller v. Cameron (In re Miller), 383
B.R. 767, 772 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008); In re Parker, 351 B.R. at 802.
74 11 U.S.C. § 521(i) states:
65

(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (4) and notwithstanding section 707(a), if an individual
debtor in a voluntary case under chapter 7 or 13 fails to file all of the information required under
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First, § 521(i)(1) states that if the debtor fails to file all of the documents
required by § 521(a)(1) by the forty-fifth day after the filing of the case, the
case shall be automatically dismissed on the forty-sixth day.75 “The dismissal
of a case terminates the exercise of the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over a
debtor and the debtor’s estate. Under certain circumstances, it is as though no
bankruptcy case had ever been initiated.”76 The dismissal of a bankruptcy case
ends the case, which also includes most of the legal consequences stemming
from the bankruptcy filing.77 Although the debtor does not get a discharge of
his debts, the debtor and the bankruptcy estate are released from bankruptcy.
As a result, the creditors are free to pursue their collection remedies outside of
bankruptcy.78
Second, § 521(i)(2) provides that, in the circumstances described in
§ 521(a)(1), “any party in interest may request the court to enter an order
dismissing the case,” which the court “shall” do within seven days of the
request.79 This suggests that the automatic dismissal can occur regardless of
any ministerial order.80 The Code does not provide courts with guidance on
how they should deal with a dismissal request filed right before the forty-five
day “automatic dismissal” deadline.81 Norton states that “[i]n the event that the
bankruptcy court does not ‘automatically’ dismiss a case on the [forty-sixth]
subsection (a)(1) within 45 days after the date of the filing of the petition, the case shall be
automatically dismissed effective on the 46th day after the date of the filing of the petition.
(2) Subject to paragraph (4) and with respect to a case described in paragraph (1), any party
in interest may request the court to enter an order dismissing the case. If requested, the court shall
enter an order of dismissal not later than 7 days after such request.
(3) Subject to paragraph (4) and upon request of the debtor made within 45 days after the
date of the filing of the petition described in paragraph (1), the court may allow the debtor an
additional period of not to exceed 45 days to file the information required under subsection (a)(1)
if the court finds justification for extending the period for the filing.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, on the motion of the trustee filed
before the expiration of the applicable period of time specified in the paragraph (1), (2), or (3),
and after notice and a hearing, the court may decline to dismiss the case if the court finds that the
debtor attempted in good faith to file all the information required by subsection (a)(1)(B)(iv) and
that the best interests of creditors would be served by administration of the case.
11 U.S.C. § 521(i).
75 Id.
76 2 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE ¶ 37.21 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.
2010).
77 1 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL ¶ 349.01 (3d ed. rev. 2010).
78 See id.
79 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(2).
80 KEITH M. LUNDIN & WILLIAM H. BROWN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY § 388.1[7] (4th ed. 2010),
available at http://www.ch13online.com.
81 Sommer, supra note 43, at 215.
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day, a [party-in-interest] can request dismissal, and the court shall dismiss the
case within [seven] days of such request.”82 However, a court order under
§ 521(i)(2) dismissing the case after forty-five days would be unnecessary if
the case has already been automatically dismissed.83
Section 521(i)(3), however, provides an express exception to the automatic
dismissal upon passage of the forty-five day deadline.84 This section states that
the court may extend the time to file the required information up to another
forty-five days if the debtor files a motion for an extension before the initial
forty-five day deadline.85 Naturally, the court must “find[] justification” for
such an extension; it also may not grant an extension for longer than another
forty-five day period.86 Curiously, the Code limits how long a court has to
decide to grant the extension. If the court waits too long, the case may
automatically be dismissed although the extension was justifiably for cause.87
The statute is also silent on whether the case is automatically dismissed if the
debtor again fails to file the required information at the end of an extension
granted by the court. Otherwise, a party-in-interest would try to get an
extension that would bar an automatic dismissal of the case, making § 521(i)
moot.88
Another exception to the automatic dismissal is found in § 521(i)(4), which
provides that the trustee may ask the court to decline to dismiss the case under
certain conditions.89 The trustee’s motion to decline to dismiss the case must
be filed before the end of the initial forty-five day period or before an
extension is given.90 Section 521(i)(4), in conjunction with § 521(i)(2), further
grants the trustee the power to make such a motion within seven days of a
“party in interest requesting the court to enter an order dismissing the case.”91
The court may uphold the trustee’s motion and decline to dismiss the case if it
finds “that the best interests of creditors would be served by administration of
82

3 NORTON, supra note 72, § 55:4.
LUNDIN & BROWN, supra note 80, § 388.1[8]. Another question arises as to how one would know that
the case has been automatically dismissed if there is no court order. Id.
84 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(3).
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Lundin, supra note 67, at 16.
88 Id. at 15.
89 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(4).
90 Id.
91 Id. § 521(i)(2), (4). The court may also grant a longer extension if the debtor has made a good faith
effort to file payment advices and the best interests of creditors are served by the continuation of the case in
chapter 7 or 13. Id. § 521(i)(4).
83
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the case” and “the debtor attempted in good faith to file all the information
required by subsection 521(a)(1)(B)(iv).”92
Honest debtors benefit from the discretion § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) grants courts
in declining to dismiss a case. With so many documents that must be filed, it
may make sense to give the debtor some leniency.93 There are many reasons
why the debtor may not be able to comply, no matter how hard he tries.94 For
example, the filing requirement for payment evidence from employers is
sometimes out of the debtor’s control.95 Thus, if the trustee acknowledges that
a good faith effort is made, then the bankruptcy court may deny the dismissal
since it is in the best interest of everyone to follow through with the
proceedings. However, this exception is limited in that it is only available to
the debtor if the trustee moves to request that the court decline to dismiss the
case.96 Without such a motion, the debtor faces dismissal of his bankruptcy
case despite going through extraordinary means to acquire and file the required
information.97
In addition to payment evidence, the debtor is also asked to provide a vast
amount of other required information.98 Section 521(i) depends heavily on
§ 521(a)(1) and specifically states that it is the debtor’s duty to file a list of
creditors99 and, “unless the Court orders otherwise,” to also provide: a schedule
of assets and liabilities; a schedule of current income and current expenditures;
a statement of the debtor’s financial affairs; a § 342(b) certificate;100 payment
advices for the sixty days before petition; an itemized statement of monthly net
income; and a statement of reasonably anticipated increases in income or
expenditures over the year following the petition.101 “The ‘information’
92 Id. § 521(i)(4). Subsection (a)(1)(B)(iv) requires the debtor to file “copies of all payment advices or
other evidence of payment received within 60 days before the date of the filing of the petition, by the debtor
from any employer of the debtor.” Id. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv).
93 See id. § 521(a)(1); LUNDIN & BROWN, supra note 80, § 388.1[5]–[6].
94 See Michael Anthony Sabella, The Category 5 Crisis: How Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Exposed
Deficiencies in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 321, 333 (2007) (noting that the document requirements and time limitations of § 521 provide quite a
significant burden for disaster victims seeking a chapter 7 discharge).
95 See id.
96 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(4).
97 See id.; LUNDIN & BROWN, supra note 80, § 388.1[5].
98 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1).
99 Id. § 521(a)(1)(A).
100 Section 521(a)(1)(B)(iii) requires an individual debtor with primarily consumer debt, his attorney, or
his bankruptcy petition preparer to file a certificate that a § 342(b) notice was delivered by the attorney to the
debtor. Id. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iii).
101 Id. § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv), (v), (vi).
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contained in all of the filings required by § 521(a)(1) is an enormous quantum
difficult or impossible to describe with precision.”102
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007(c) requires a debtor to file
most of the documents required by § 521(a)(1)(B) with his petition or within
fourteen days thereafter.103 An extension for the filing of schedules, statements,
and other documents may be granted if sufficient cause is shown.104 However,
such an extension “would not extend the [forty-five]-day deadline to avoid
automatic dismissal under § 521(i)(1).”105 The precision and care with which
schedules are prepared reflect the value of the discharge obtained by the
debtor. Therefore debtors must be especially meticulous when it comes to
§ 521(a)(1) and Rule 1007.106
The concept of “automatic dismissal” seems troubling because it suggests
that something happened behind the scenes without a court action.107 In other
words, a case may be dismissed invisibly without any judicial determination or
any review by the court in general. Neither bankruptcy judges nor clerks are
compelled to “fill the voids in the absence of ordinary adversary process.”108
The “automatic” feature of the § 521(i) dismissal may harm honest debtors and
benefit dishonest debtors. For example, a debtor may intentionally fail to file a
required document in an effort to get his case dismissed. In these instances,
courts have interpreted § 521(i) as resulting in either strict dismissal, nondismissal of the case due to good faith, or a finding that any missing
information was not required.109
These vastly different interpretations and results stemming from a single
section of the Code need to be explored in greater detail. This Comment will
proceed to analyze how a textual approach to § 521(i) created an absolute right
of dismissal, which in turn encouraged abuse of the bankruptcy system by
dishonest debtors and wreaked havoc on the proceedings of honest debtors.
Most bankruptcy courts have interpreted § 521’s provisions very narrowly,
acknowledging that the statute limits their judicial discretion.110 Limiting the
102

LUNDIN & BROWN, supra note 80, § 388.1[5].
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c).
104 Id.
105 LUNDIN & BROWN, supra note 80, § 388.1[10].
106 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 60, ¶ 521.03[3].
107 Lundin, supra note 67, at 15.
108 LUNDIN & BROWN, supra note 80, § 388.1[21].
109 3 NORTON, supra note 72, § 55:4.
110 See In re Catania, 397 B.R. 667, 669 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Scalise, No. 08-61739, 2008
Bankr. LEXIS 2983, at *5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008).
103
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bankruptcy court’s discretionary authority, however, has encouraged
bankruptcy abuse.111 An abusive and manipulative debtor can easily have his
case automatically dismissed simply by declining to comply with the
§ 521(a)(1) filing requirement.112 Dismissal is, naturally, beneficial for the
debtor in order to escape “estate administration” by the trustee, especially
when the trustee discovers assets that the debtor tried to hide or when the
debtor is generally not happy with how his bankruptcy case is turning out. This
Comment will proceed to analyze how a certain amount of judicial discretion
promotes the values of BAPCPA and bankruptcy law in general.
II. ARGUMENT
A. Textualism and Absolute Right to Automatic Dismissal
The Supreme Court has held that the starting point in statutory
interpretation is the text of the statute itself.113 Championed by Supreme Court
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, textualism is based on the
theory that the language of a statute should be read to reflect the meaning of its
text at the time it was written.114 The Supreme Court often follows the “plain
meaning” rule, which precludes looking at external sources like legislative
history if the statute is clear.115 In uncovering the true meaning of a statute,
textualists look at word choice, placement of words in the document, and
overall grammatical structure.116 In addition, textualists compare related parts
of the statute and give weight to subtle similarities and differences.117 Thus for
textualists if the language of the statute is relatively clear, there is no need to
look outside the statute in order to determine the statute’s meaning.118
Textualists argue that a plain meaning analysis may be the best guide for
interpreting a statute since it can be the most obvious and most objective way
for one to know and understand what the law requires.119
111

Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren), 568 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id.
113 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (“[W]here . . . the statute’s language
is plain, the ‘sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’”).
114 William Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the
Case of Amar’s Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 496 (2007).
115 See YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 2 (2008).
116 Treanor, supra note 114, at 488.
117 Id.
118 KIM, supra note 115, at 2.
119 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 227 (2006).
112
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Another distinguishing feature of textualism is the “whole act” rule, which
dictates that a statute should be read as a coherent whole, with its various parts
interpreted within the structure of the document in a way that furthers statutory
purposes.120 Justice Scalia remarked that
[s]tatutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that
may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder
of the statutory scheme—because the same terminology is used
elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear, or because only
one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is
121
compatible with the rest of the law.

Textualism dictates that whenever a court interprets a statute, it must start
with the text of the statute itself and, if the language of the statute is plain,
interpret such language by its common usage.122 The courts presume that
Congress acted “intentionally and purposely when it include[d] particular
language in one section of a statute but omitted it in another.”123 Thus,
textualism compels courts to conclude that the inclusion of the “automatic
dismissal” language in § 521 is both meaningful and purposeful.
Textualist methodology is attractive to those who would constrain judicial
discretion by limiting the manner in which statutes can be interpreted.124
Modern textualism established itself as a response to the perceived excessive
use of purposivism125 in statutory interpretation, which was criticized for being
a simple façade for judges to yield results with which they personally agree.126
Textualists claim that their approach appropriately and meaningfully constrains
judges.127
However, textualism has flaws as well. It has been criticized for focusing
on the manner in which words are used in a document, while overlooking other

120 Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1971, 1973 (2007).
121 United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988).
122 See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989); KIM, supra note 115, at 2.
123 BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 537 (1994) (quoting City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def.
Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994)); see also KIM, supra note 115, at 14.
124 See Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1937 (2008).
125 Purposivism is an approach to statutory interpretation requiring a court to determine the purpose of a
particular statute. Id. at 1898.
126 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26 (2006) (describing
how textualists saw their approach as a means of constraining judges); Smith, supra note 124, at 1937.
127 See Molot, supra note 126, at 26.
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significant evidence regarding its meaning.128 The location of text may actually
be of limited significance, which can only be determined by looking at some
legislative and drafting history.129 Many textualists tend to ignore that the
statutory text does not reflect a consistent underlying ideology.130 In addition,
certain academics warn that “[i]n its strongest version, textualism is the notion
that a text can have a meaning independent of the intention of its author(s).”131
Furthermore, “sincere textualists . . . claim to find a text’s ‘plain meaning’ [by
making] assumptions about the authors’ intentions without being aware that
they are doing so.”132 A close reading may thus reflect the creativity of the
interpreter.133 Supporters of this view argue that the plain meaning of the
statute may be used unless: “1) a literal application of the statutory language
would be at odds with the manifest intent of the legislature; 2) a literal
application of the statutory language would produce an absurd result; or 3) the
statutory language is ambiguous.”134 In such cases, the intention of the drafters
controls, rather than the strict language.135 What effect does § 521(i) have
when its plain meaning is applied in bankruptcy?
1. Textual Analysis of § 521(i)
The dictionary provides a good starting point to begin to untangle the
meaning of the words found in § 521(i).136 The Supreme Court has determined
that when words are not statutorily defined and are not terms of art, they are
given their ordinary meaning, which is commonly a dictionary definition.137
Dictionary definitions are not always clear, however, and words may have
several alternative meanings. Thus, the context and the way the words are used
become important.138 Even when there is only one definition, the dictionary

128

See Treanor, supra note 114, at 493.
Id. (examining textualist approach in light of historical evidence).
130 See id.
131 Braucher, supra note 42, at 98.
132 Id.
133 See Treanor, supra note 114, at 489.
134 In re Jass, 340 B.R. 411, 415 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006); see also United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S.
39, 47 n.5 (1994) (dismissing an interpretation said to lead to an absurd result).
135 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).
136 See Molot, supra note 126, at 44.
137 FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994). In the absence of a statutory definition, one must “construe
a statutory term in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.” Id.
138 See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 226–28 (1994) (examining the
surrounding statutory language to resolve conflicting dictionary definitions of the word “modify”).
129
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meaning may still cause confusion.139 Nevertheless, dictionary definitions
serve as an appropriate starting point in statutory interpretation.140
The most important clause of § 521(i) states that “[if a debtor] fails to file
all of the information required under subsection (a)(1) within [forty-five] days
after the date of the filing of the petition, the case shall be automatically
dismissed effective on the 46th day after the date of the filing of the
petition.”141 Most of the confusion stems from the words “shall” and
“automatic.” The principal definition of “shall” in Black’s Law Dictionary is:
“Has a duty to; more broadly, is required to.”142 Additionally, Webster’s
Dictionary defines “shall” as “will have to; must” and, in law, “to express what
is mandatory.”143 The word “shall” imposes an obligation on the subject of a
sentence and conveys a sense of a future duty. The use of “shall” ordinarily
means that it is mandatory and not subject to judicial discretion.144 If the word
“may” was used instead, it would mean that particular action was permissive
and up to the judge’s discretion.145 Here, § 521(i) is quite unambiguous: the
word “shall” means that a judge has no discretion to decide whether to act.
Simply put, the judge must dismiss the case if a debtor does not meet the
requirements of § 521(i).
Unfortunately, the word “automatically” unravels the apparent clarity of the
meaning of the word “shall” and has produced a lot of discussion as to its
meaning.146 Webster’s Dictionary defines “automatic” as “acting or done

139

See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). Dissenting, Justice Scalia cut to the core:
To use an instrumentality ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose. When someone
asks, “Do you use a cane?,” he is not inquiring whether you have your grandfather’s silverhandled walking stick on display in the hall; he wants to know whether you walk with a cane.
Similarly, to speak of “using a firearm” is to speak of using it for its distinctive purpose, i.e., as a
weapon.

Id. at 242.
140 Meyer, 510 U.S. at 476.
141 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1) (2006).
142 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1407 (8th ed. 2004).
143 MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/shall (last
visited Jan. 2011).
144 See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (“[T]he
mandatory ‘shall’ . . . normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.”).
145 Rastelli v. Warden, Metro. Corr. Ctr., 782 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The use of a permissive verb—
‘may review’ instead of ‘shall review’—suggests a discretionary rather than mandatory review process.”).
146 See In re Lopez, No. 09-31511-C, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3029, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2009);
In re Hall, 368 B.R. 595, 598–99 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007); In re Riddle, 344 B.R. 702, 702–03 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 2006); In re Fawson, 338 B.R. 505, 510 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006).
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spontaneously or unconsciously.”147 Citing a dictionary, the court in In re
Fawson noted that the word “automatic” means “having inherent power of
action or motion; self-acting or self-regulating; mechanical.”148 The court held
that there was no ambiguity in the construction of the statute and therefore
“[§] 521(i)(1) does not contemplate any independent action by the Court or any
other party—the case is merely dismissed by operation of the statute itself.”149
Thus the word “automatic” implies, by definition, that a case would be
dismissed without a judicial or ministerial act, on its own accord after the
passage of time. But the use of both “shall” and “automatically” creates an
apparent contradiction in the statute, as it simultaneously mandates the court to
dismiss a case and instructs the court that the case dismisses itself without
action of the court.
The words “shall” and “automatic” both seem to limit judicial discretion by
definition. As a result, § 521(i) seems to become very unforgiving and
mandates that a case be dismissed as soon as the requirements for dismissal are
met, without any involvement of a bankruptcy judge. As a result, a textualist
interpretation of § 521(i) results in absolute dismissal if all the required
information is not filed within forty-five days.150 A plain meaning
interpretation limits the number of cases that bankruptcy courts have to deal
with and filters out debtors who simply wish to benefit from the automatic stay
without having the required information for a bankruptcy proceeding.151
Congress’s concern with the number of yearly bankruptcy filings due to the
fact that bankruptcy relief was too readily available would be directly
addressed.152 A textualist approach to § 521(i) decreases the use of various
loopholes and incentives that encourage opportunistic bankruptcy filings.
Assuming that the most important provisions of § 521(i) have a discernable
plain meaning, what effect would that have? The following cases show some
of the results where bankruptcy courts read § 521(i) as unambiguous and gave
judges no choice but to follow the plain meaning of the text as prescribed by
Congress.

147 MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/automatic
(last visited Jan. 2011).
148 In re Fawson, 338 B.R. at 510 n.9 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (rev. 4th ed. 1951)).
149 Id. at 510.
150 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1) (2006); In re Hall, 368 B.R. at 599–600.
151 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(4); H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
152 H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 1.
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2. Honest Debtors and Absolute Dismissal Under § 521(i)
Many bankruptcy courts have held that they had no discretion to bypass or
enlarge the forty-five day limit in which the debtor must file the information
required by § 521(a)(1). These courts interpret the rule to mean that the
debtor’s case is automatically dismissed on the forty-sixth day unless the
debtor or trustee files a timely request within the forty-five day time frame.153
In In re Wassah, a chapter 13 debtor failed to file the necessary information
within the required time limit.154 The debtor argued that he was attempting to
calculate his debt owed, but he never provided any excusable reason for his
failure.155 The debtor failed to file required documents, file a chapter 13 plan,
attend a meeting of creditors, or provide the trustee with copies of tax returns
and other mandatory documents. The court held that it was appropriate to
uphold the dismissal orders because no reason was given as to why the debtor
did not timely file the information.156 This is a legitimate example of how the
BAPCPA provisions sought to promote efficiency and reserve access to the
bankruptcy courts only for those who are truly prepared. However, such ideal
outcomes do not always occur.
Many courts believe that they have “no discretion but to follow the
direction of Congress” and, in some instances, have dismissed bankruptcy
cases of apparently honest debtors.157 In In re Catania, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of New York dismissed the case
“automatically” due to the debtor’s failure to file all of the pay advices.158 The
debtor’s attorneys noticed that the initially filed payment advices were
incomplete.159 The attorneys sought to correct their mistake within the allotted
forty-five day time period; however, they again mistakenly filed the same
incomplete set of documents.160 Forty-five days passed without the complete

153

In re Scalise, No. 08-61739, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2983, at *4 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008).
In re Wassah, 417 B.R. 175, 177 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2009).
155 Id. at 185.
156 Id.
157 In re Catania, 397 B.R. 667, 669 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2008); see also In re Neil, No. 07-21107, 2007
Bankr. LEXIS 3479, at *10 (Bankr. D. Utah Aug. 9, 2007); In re Lovato, 343 B.R. 268, 270 (Bankr. D.N.M.
2006) (“After the expiration of the time limits set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1), the Court is left with no
discretion to allow the Debtor additional time within which to comply with the requirement for submission of
payment advices.”); In re Monroe, No.06-02869-W, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 3256, at *4 (Bankr. D.S.C. Nov. 13,
2006); In re Williams, 339 B.R. 794, 795 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).
158 In re Catania, 397 B.R. at 670.
159 Id. at 668–69.
160 Id. at 669.
154
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required filing.161 Again, the attorneys noticed their mistake and tried to
immediately file the missing information, but it was too late.162 Upon the
Trustee’s motion to dismiss, Judge Bucki held that the debtor’s case was
automatically dismissed according to § 521(i) because the debtor did not file
all of the information required under § 521(a).163
The debtor argued that he made a good faith effort to comply with the
necessary statutory provisions and that his counsel attempted to provide the
missing information immediately after learning about the mistake.164 The
debtor also argued that “the missing advices contain[ed] no information that
could possibly affect the course of case administration, and that dismissal
would serve no meritorious purpose.”165 The court seemed sympathetic to the
debtor’s arguments, but it nevertheless enforced the automatic dismissal
provision after considering Congress’s intention and the statute’s plain
language.166 Most importantly, the court acknowledged that the case was
“already . . . dismissed automatically by operation of [§] 521(i)(1)” and that the
trustee was only memorializing the dismissal.167 The court further stated that
the “Bankruptcy Code will produce results that strictly penalize debtors who
would otherwise deserve a discharge.”168 Thus, a strict and rigid interpretation
of § 521(i) prevented an honest debtor from receiving a bankruptcy discharge
and a fresh start. A lack of judicial discretion resulted in weakening the values
of BAPCPA and the policy goals of bankruptcy in general.
In re Scalise had a similar outcome, where miniscule mistakes and
procedural irregularities led to dismissal of an honest debtor’s case.169 In
Scalise, a chapter 7 debtor filed a voluntary petition and a statement indicating
that he had attached payment advices required by § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv).170 Then,
it became apparent that one pay period was missing and thus the documents
161

Id.
Id.
163 In re Catania, 397 B.R. 667, 669 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2008).
164 Id.
165 Id. The debtor’s counsel further argued that “dismissal would merely compel the needless exercise of
filing a new bankruptcy petition, all at additional cost and the imposition of administrative burdens upon the
bankruptcy system.” Id.
166 Id. at 670 (“The court does not doubt the debtor’s intent to file all of the required payment advices.
Unfortunately, the statute requires something more . . . .”).
167 Id. at 669.
168 Id.
169 See In re Scalise, No. 08-61739, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2983, at *5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008).
170 Id. at *1. Because the PDFs of the payment advices turned out to be unreadable, the debtor’s attorney
immediately filed another set of electronic copies of payment advices for five periods. Id. at *1–2.
162
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submitted did not include all pay stubs for the sixty days prior to the date of the
filing.171 The trustee requested that the case be dismissed, since more than
forty-five days had passed and not all of the required payment advices were
included.172 In response, the debtor’s attorney filed the missing payment
period, fulfilling the requirements of § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv).173 Thus, all the
“information” § 521(i)(1) requires was provided to the court.174
The debtor argued that although not all of the payment advices were
available, he had the same income for each of the periods.175 In addition, the
debtor argued that he made a good faith effort in his attempt to comply with
the Code and that the failure to file one pay stub was “simply an oversight”
which he remedied upon notice that it was missing.176 The debtor also claimed
that “no creditor or [party-in-interest] has been prejudiced by the lack of this
one payment advice” and that re-filing would result in a greater expense to the
bankruptcy court and an inconvenience to the creditor.177
The court acknowledged that the debtor made reasonable efforts to comply
with § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) of the Code.178 However, the court noted that the
statutory provisions did not permit any judicial discretion.179 The court
acknowledged that the dismissal of a case of an honest, albeit careless, debtor
“may seem . . . harsh” but held that dismissal was “mandated by the statute.”180
The court noted that debtors have two “safety valves” to avoid the dismissal of
the case.181 However, only one “safety valve” was truly available to the debtor,
as the other one requires initiation by the trustee.182 The court claimed that
§ 521(i)(3) would have permitted the debtor to request an extension of the
forty-five day period to file all required documents.183 Not knowing that there
171

Id. at *2.
Id.
173 See id. at *3.
174 See id.; 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1) (2006).
175 In re Scalise, No. 08-61739, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2983, at *3 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008).
176 Id. The later pay stub was representative of all of his payment advices throughout the sixty days prior
to filing of the petition. Id. at *5.
177 Id. at *3.
178 Id. at *4–5.
179 Id. at *5.
180 Id.
181 Id. at *4.
182 See id. The trustee would have had to request that the case not be dismissed due to the debtor’s good
faith attempt to file all the required information. Here, the opposite happened and the trustee requested a
dismissal of the case; thus, that “safety valve” was never available to the debtor. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C.
§ 521(i)(4) (2006).
183 In re Scalise, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2983 at *4.
172
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was a missing stub, however, it would be nearly impossible to put such a
“safety valve” into use.184
The two aforementioned cases, Catania and Scalise, are good examples in
which an honest debtor, seeking relief through bankruptcy, had a case thrown
out because the courts employed a strictly textual interpretation of § 521 and
refused to use judicial discretion. Bankruptcy is meant to provide a procedure
by which honest consumers can obtain a discharge of debt and a fresh start.
Instead, the debtors in these two cases encountered further hardships and
encumbrances by having to re-file their petitions.
3. Abuse and Problems of the Absolute Right to Dismissal Under § 521(i)
Through BAPCPA, Congress amended § 521 of the Code to expand
debtors’ duties of financial disclosure by mandating that debtors file a list of
creditors and other required financial information. As discussed earlier, a
strictly textual interpretation of the newly adapted provision found in § 521(i)
greatly limits judicial discretion and establishes an absolute right to dismissal.
Courts look at the plain meaning of the statute and follow through with its
technicality by dismissing any case in which the debtor fails, regardless of the
reason for failure, to file all of the required information within the forty-five
day deadline. In the hands of a dishonest debtor, the absolute right to dismissal
seen in Catania and Scalise is a very powerful tool that can be used to
manipulate the bankruptcy system to the debtor’s needs. Simply by
withholding a document or two, a debtor is able to have his case dismissed.
A dishonest debtor can use § 521(i) in strategic ways. Numerous benefits
flow to the debtor as soon as he files for bankruptcy. Most importantly, the
automatic stay stops the collection process and prevents wage garnishment.185
Also, the automatic stay prevents creditors from repossessing a debtor’s
property and may even require creditors to return repossessed property.186 As a
result, the debtor gains valuable time to put his affairs in order and frustrate his
creditors. If a debtor later decides that bankruptcy is no longer in his best
interest, after forty-five days he may ask the court to dismiss the case based on

184 See id. It seems the court mentioned the “safety valves” in an attempt to reassure itself that it was
indeed following the intent of Congress through its mechanical application of § 521. See id.
185 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); In re Suarez, 149 B.R. 193, 195 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1993).
186 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); Transouth Fin. Corp. v. Sharon (In re Sharon), 234 B.R. 676, 681–82 (B.A.P.
6th Cir. 1999).
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§ 521(i).187 As a result, the debtor is able to avoid the possible consequences of
a pending motion to dismiss the bankruptcy case with prejudice.
The consequences of dismissal may be minimal, since the case was
dismissed automatically rather than by court order or judgment.188 After
enough time has passed, the debtor may once again file for bankruptcy and
potentially get the discharge that he was after. The abuse of § 521(i) presents a
moral hazard that benefits dishonest debtors who seek only to delay the
collection attempts of creditors and frustrate the purposes of the bankruptcy
system. Thus, the same technical interpretation of § 521(i) that limits judicial
discretion to help honest debtors also limits judicial discretion to avoid abuse
by dishonest debtors.
The following cases demonstrate the potential for abuse inherent in § 521(i)
and the inability of courts to prevent the abuse. In In re Hall, the debtor filed
numerous adversary proceedings against secured creditors claiming their liens
to be invalid for “ridiculous and legally unsupportable reasons.”189 The debtor
filed a chapter 13 case, which was later dismissed. The debtor then filed a
second chapter 13 case.190 Only after the second chapter 13 case was converted
to chapter 7 did the debtor file a motion to reflect that his case had already
been automatically dismissed on the forty-sixth day after the petition.191 The
debtor claimed that he failed to comply with the provisions of § 521(a), since
the documents he filed were incomplete.192 During a hearing, the court was
finally able to shed some light on the debtor’s extensive use of bankruptcy
proceedings:
Primarily the Court found that the Debtor was not engaging in the
pursuit of [c]hapter 13 for the legitimate purposes for which it
existed, but it was simply part of his plan to frustrate his secured
creditors in realizing upon their collateral as he had not paid them any
payments in the first case and he had filed adversary proceedings
187

11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(2).
Usually, if a debtor files a second bankruptcy case within a year of a prior pending bankruptcy case,
the automatic stay expires thirty days after the filing. Id. § 362(c)(3). Automatic dismissal also affects honest
debtors because “an automatic statutory dismissal is not the kind of action contemplated by [Federal] Rule [of
Civil Procedure] 60(b).” In re Wilkinson, 346 B.R. 539, 546 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006). Thus, no relief can be
granted under Rule 60(b).
189 In re Hall, 368 B.R. 595, 601 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).
190 Id. at 596.
191 Id. at 598.
192 Id. Although the debtor filed schedules of financial affairs as well as a chapter 13 plan within the
required forty-five days, virtually every page of those documents contained “TBA” or “To Be Amended.” Id.
at 596. Also, the filed documents contained no additional information except for his name and case number. Id.
188
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challenging each of his secured creditor’s liens upon what can only
193
be described as the most spurious bases.

Only after the debtor voluntarily converted his chapter 13 case to a chapter
7 did it become apparent that, while his case was pending as a chapter 13 case,
he “executed deeds to the three pieces of real property, without notice to
creditors or seeking [c]ourt authorization, conveying virtually all interest
therein to a corporate entity which he controlled—KWI Legal Defense Fund,
Inc.”194 His adverse behavior did not stop there. At the hearings, assuming he
showed up, the debtor refused to answer virtually every question, asserting his
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.195
Persuaded by the trustee, the court reluctantly entered an order to enjoin the
debtor from taking any action in controlling or transferring the estate’s
property, enjoin the debtor from filing any adversary proceeding in relation to
property of the estate, and sanction the debtor.196 In response, the debtor
moved the court to enter an order of dismissal, noting that his bankruptcy case
had already been automatically dismissed on the forty-sixth day after the
petition date under § 521(i)(1) due to his failure to comply with the provisions
of § 521(a).197
Concerned that bad faith might be at play, the court assessed the legitimacy
and motivation of the debtor’s request for automatic dismissal.198 The court
then went through the statute looking for any provision that would keep the
debtor in court.199 However, the court found nothing in the statute that would
provide it with the ability to exercise discretion.200 Thus, the court had to
dismiss the case based on the § 521(i) requirements.201 The court noted that the
193

Id.
Id. at 597.
195 Id.
196 Id. at 598.
197 Id.
198 Id. at 601–02.
199 Id. at 599. Here, the court was looking for judicial discretion that might have been found solely within
the text of the statute itself. See id.
200 This court acknowledged that the court in In re Parker made excellent arguments as to why a debtor
should not be able to take advantage of § 521(i) and its automatic dismissal provision if the debtor’s case
“starts going badly.” Id. at 599–600; see In re Parker, 351 B.R. 790, 800–02 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).
201 In re Hall, 368 B.R. at 600. Although the case was dismissed, it nevertheless prohibited the debtor
from filing any petition under title 11 for two years.
194

Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Marrama, this Court concludes that when a
debtor seeks an order confirming the dismissal of his case under § 521(i)(2) by reason of his own
defalcation under § 521(a)(1), it is legitimate for the Court to inquire into the motivation and/or
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only basis on which it could decline to enter an order for dismissal was if it
was requested by the trustee within five days after a party-in-interest made
such a request.202 However, in this case, the debtor failed to comply with
§ 521(a) since his schedules and statement of financial affairs contained
virtually no meaningful information.203
This is a clear case in which the debtor managed to manipulate the
requirements of § 521 to force a dismissal. The debtor showed little regard for
bankruptcy laws and proceedings. Instead, the debtor manipulated § 521 in an
attempt to frustrate legitimate collection efforts by his secured creditors. Hall
illustrates one of the biggest issues with § 521(i): an abusive and manipulative
debtor can easily have his case automatically dismissed simply by declining to
comply with the § 521(a)(1) filing requirement within the time allotted by
§ 521(i).
In a similar case, a United States Bankruptcy Court in Texas noted that
“nothing in 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1) provides an exception for a debtor who may
have filed his bankruptcy case in bad faith.”204 In In re Richardson, the debtor
filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition after learning that the state court ordered
the debtor to pay twelve months of arrears as a condition to enjoining a
foreclosure of the debtor’s home.205 Other than her petition, the only document
she filed was a motion asking the Court to waive the requirements for budget
and credit counseling.206 The debtor’s petition lacked schedules or statements
as required by § 521(a).207
The forty-five day period passed, and the debtor failed to file the required
documents.208 Accordingly, the bankruptcy court entered an “Order
Evidencing Automatic Dismissal of Chapter 13 Case of Individual Debtor(s)
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1).”209 However, prior to the court’s entry of the
good faith (or lack thereof) of the debtor in seeking such order; and, in the event the debtor is
acting in bad faith, to properly condition such dismissal so that the debtor is not rewarded by his
own malfeasance.
Id. at 602.
202 Id. at 599. Additionally, the court must also find that the debtor attempted to file his payment advices
in good faith, and it was in the best interest of the creditors to have the case administered. Id.
203 Id. It was amended seven months later, but that was too late for the court to consider. Id.
204 In re Richardson, No. 07-42881, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 229, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2008).
205 Id. at *1–2.
206 Id. at *2.
207 Id.
208 Id. at *2–3.
209 Id. at *3.
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automatic dismissal, Wells Fargo filed a motion to dismiss the case with
prejudice based on the debtor’s alleged bad faith.210 Wells Fargo claimed that
§ 105(a) empowered the court to dismiss the debtor’s case with prejudice. 211
The court acknowledged that it did not seek to condone the use of § 521(i)
by a debtor who sought to avoid the possible consequences of a pending
motion.212 However, it was not willing to dismiss the bankruptcy case with
prejudice.213 The court claimed there was nothing in § 521(i)(1) that it could
use to except a debtor who may have filed his bankruptcy case in bad faith.214
The judge recognized that one of Congress’s goals in enacting the BAPCPA
amendments was to replace judicial discretion with streamlined statutory
standards and formulas.215 Congress primarily wanted to reduce the number of
bankruptcy filings, rather than provide increased protections for creditors.216
The court held that the case was automatically dismissed on the forty-sixth
day, and that the court had no discretion to amend the dismissal based on
equitable principles.217 The court simply stated that Wells Fargo should have
served its motion to dismiss with prejudice before the expiration of the fortyfive day deadline so that it could be considered by the court before the
automatic dismissal of § 521(i)(1).218 Although such a suggestion may be
helpful for future cases, it is not applicable where a debtor files a surprise
motion to dismiss his own case under § 521(i) due to his own intentional
failure to file the required information.
The court was also reluctant to grant Wells Fargo’s motion for dismissal
with prejudice based on § 105(a).219 According to the court, § 105(a) does not
empower the court to: (1) vacate a dismissal that has occurred automatically as
prescribed by § 521(i)(1); (2) alter the statutory penalty of § 521(i)(1); or (3)
210 Id. Wells Fargo seemed to ask for similar sanctions that the court in In re Hall imposed upon the
debtor for his alleged bad faith actions in abusing the bankruptcy proceedings. See In re Hall, 368 B.R. 595,
599 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).
211 In re Richardson, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 229, at *4.
212 Id. at *6.
213 Id. at *4.
214 Id. at *6.
215 Id.
216 Id. at *6–7. Although the judge claimed that BAPCPA did not increase protections for creditors, other
courts and scholars claim the opposite. In re Ott, 343 B.R. 264, 266 (Bankr. D. Col. 2006). If taken as a whole,
BAPCPA is full of creditor-friendly language to remedy a perceived imbalance in the Code favoring debtors.
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2 (2005),
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
217 In re Richardson, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 229, at *7 n.2.
218 Id. at *7.
219 Id. at *4.
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“judicially legislate perceived shortcomings in existing law.”220 Thus,
Congress made clear that failing to comply with § 521(a) results in automatic
dismissal of the case as a matter of law—not by an action of the judge.221
The absurdity of § 521(i) was quickly captured in one of the more
entertaining cases aptly named In re Riddle. Here, Chief Judge A. Jay Cristol
contemplated what exactly Congress meant when it said that a case is
“automatically dismissed” if the debtor fails to file the required information
within forty-five days.222 In an apparent tribute to Dr. Seuss’ legendary book
“Green Eggs and Ham,” the judge observed:
I do not like dismissal automatic,
It seems to me to be traumatic.
I do not like it in this case,
I do not like it any place.
As a judge I am most keen
to understand, What does it mean?
How can any person know
what the docket does not show?
...
What does automatic dismissal mean?
And by what means can it be seen?
Are we only left to guess?
Oh please Congress, fix this mess!
Until it’s fixed what should I do?
223
How can I explain this mess to you?

The majority of bankruptcy courts have enforced the automatic dismissal
provision of § 521(i) as absolute and not subject to judicial discretion.224
Accordingly, these courts believe that the automatic dismissal language of

220

Id. (quoting IRS v. Farrell (In re Farrell), 241 B.R. 348, 349 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1999)).
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B), (4)(B) (2006).
222 In re Riddle, 344 B.R. 702, 702–03 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006).
223 Id. at 703. Fortunately, the debtors had in fact filed all of the information required by § 521(a)(1), so
the case was not automatically dismissed pursuant to § 521(i)(1). Id.
224 See In re Catania, 397 B.R. 667, 669 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Lovato, 343 B.R. 268, 270
(Bankr. D.N.M. 2006) (“Debtor’s case must be dismissed because BAPCPA leaves the Court with no
discretion to fashion any reasonable or equitable solution.”); In re Ott, 343 B.R. 264, 268 (Bankr. D. Colo.
2006) (holding that the court has no discretion under § 521(i) other than to dismiss a case where the documents
were not filed within forty-five days and no timely request to extend the time for such filing was made); In re
Williams, 339 B.R. 794, 795 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (explaining that under BAPCPA, the court has no
discretion to extend a debtor’s time for filing).
221
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§ 521(i)(1) would have no meaning or effect if the case was not dismissed until
requested by a party-in-interest.225 Therefore, they have continually held that
the case is indeed automatically dismissed on the forty-sixth day, unless the
Court has either extended the time on a timely request by the debtor or a timely
motion by the trustee within the forty-five day period.226
Section 521 is neither clear nor mechanical. For example, since a
bankruptcy case gets to be automatically dismissed by the mere passage of
time, it is difficult to say which way a case was dismissed.227 This causes
confusion in the system. Additionally, neither the trustee nor the judge knows
whether any information is missing until a party-in-interest requests an order of
dismissal, since just by looking at the documents it cannot be determined
whether all the “information” was fully submitted.228 The debtor himself is the
person most likely to know whether the information has been fully submitted.
Because “[a] request for an order memorializing the automatic dismissal of a
case is unlikely until after [forty-five] days after the petition,”229 it is only after
the court acts on the request that it becomes apparent whether all the
information is available and whether that case has been automatically
dismissed.
Although § 521 was “designed to prevent abuses by debtors who do not
take their responsibilities seriously and fail to provide the Court and interested
parties with the information necessary to administer a bankruptcy case,” a
textual reading of § 521 can create more problems than § 521 was meant to
solve.230 Most importantly, a strict reading of § 521(i) would allow debtors to
“test the waters.”231 This allows abusive debtors to minimize their exposure to
creditors while also abusing the power of the automatic stay. Simply
withholding certain documents required under § 521 can have the case
225

See In re Ott, 343 B.R. at 268. One of the rules of statutory construction states that one provision
should not be interpreted in such a manner that it would contradict or render another provision of the same
statute inconsistent or meaningless. See DirecTV v. Hoa Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 2007).
226 See In re Lovato, 343 B.R. at 270; In re Catania, 397 B.R. at 670.
227 See Lundin, supra note 67, at 15–16.
228 Id. “Based on software and recommendations from the [U.S. Courts’] Administrative Office, it is
likely that many bankruptcy courts will establish ‘internal’ procedures for tracking the documents filed in
consumer bankruptcy cases to identify cases in which ‘information’ is missing after the [forty-five]-day period
in new § 521(i).” LUNDIN & BROWN, supra note 80, § 388.1[20]. “A review of the docket will not, for
example, necessarily inform as to whether debtor received pay advices during the requisite period.” In re
Parker, 351 B.R. 790, 801 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).
229 Lundin, supra note 67, at 15–16.
230 In re Parker, 351 B.R. at 800.
231 Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren), 568 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009).
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automatically dismissed, frustrating the trustee, creditors, and the judicial
system.232
Additionally, the debtor can intentionally use the automatic dismissal when
faced with an objection to a discharge due to a material omission or error on
his schedules.233 He may simply claim that under § 521(i) not all the
information was submitted and that caused the resulting errors and omissions
on the schedules.234 After correcting the problems, the debtor may simply refile and obtain a discharge. Thus, an automatic dismissal without a court order
allows the debtor to return to court immediately. Once back in court, the debtor
is again protected by the automatic stay and continues to frustrate creditors
who are unable to collect. Some creditors may even have to go into bankruptcy
themselves, since they did not plan on the debtor withholding payment for such
a prolonged time.
Similarly, if the trustee learns of a preferential transfer to a third party sixty
days before the filing of the case that was not disclosed on the petition, the
third-party-in-interest can use § 521 to have the case automatically
dismissed.235 This would require dismissal of any preference action
commenced by the trustee.236 The bankruptcy judge in In re Parker noted that
“[t]he debtor can then re-file when the preference has sufficiently aged to be
unavoidable.”237 Such blatant abuse of § 521 goes against what Congress tried
to achieve when it enacted BAPCPA.238
Section 521 also seems to create additional avenues for chapter 7 debtors to
dismiss their cases.239 Normally, an individual who files a chapter 13 petition
has the right to dismiss the case at any time, but a case under chapter 7 can
only be dismissed for cause after notice and a hearing.240 In a chapter 7 case,
the courts consider the interest of the creditors, trustee, and all the other parties
involved.241 The courts tend to have a lot of discretion in ruling on a motion to
232

Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1), (i)(1) (2006); In re Hall, 368 B.R. 595, 596 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).
234 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i); In re Hall, 368 B.R. at 600–01.
235 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(2); In re Parker, 351 B.R. at 801.
236 In re Parker, 351 B.R. at 802.
237 Id.
238 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 3 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 92.
239 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a)(3); Segarra-Miranda v. Acosta-Rivera (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8, 13
(1st Cir. 2009); Smith v. Geltzer (In re Smith), 507 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2007); In re Withers, No. 06-42098
TM, 2007 WL 628078, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2007).
240 See 11 U.S.C. § 707(a); In re Withers, 2007 WL 628078, at *3.
241 See In re Smith, 507 F.3d at 72–73.
233
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dismiss a chapter 7 bankruptcy case by equitably evaluating the best interests
of the parties and whether there is any prejudice to the creditors as a result of
the dismissal.242 However, § 521 removes all judicial discretion and allows for
a chapter 7 debtor to dismiss the case without a court hearing and without
showing cause.243 One court noted that “[t]o give a chapter 7 debtor the
absolute right to cause the automatic dismissal of the case forty-five days after
it is filed would represent a dramatic change in the law and would open the
door to abuse.”244
While dishonest debtors are able to benefit from a strict interpretation of
§ 521, honest but unfortunate debtors are sometimes penalized.245 For example,
§ 521 places an unintentional burden on debtors that have been affected by
disasters.246 The document requirements and time limitation of § 521 provide
quite a significant burden for disaster victims seeking a chapter 7 discharge.247
Michael Anthony Sabella noted that “[a]ccess to these documents is extremely
limited for disaster victims that file for bankruptcy immediately following the
disaster because their financial records and documents may be missing or
destroyed.”248 As a result, it becomes difficult or impossible for debtors to
fulfill the requirements of § 521 within the allotted forty-five days, no matter
their diligence. Without judicial discretion, a court would neither be able to
limit an absolute right to dismissal nor consider whether enough information
has been collected to allow a debtor to proceed with filing for bankruptcy.249
A strict interpretation of § 521 leads to many unintended consequences—
such as an absolute right of dismissal—which encourage abuse of the
bankruptcy system by dishonest debtors and leads to unfavorable outcomes for
honest but unfortunate debtors. Based on the bankruptcy courts’ equitable
powers and Congress’s intent in enacting BAPCPA, it is unlikely that
Congress intended to create a procedure that would allow a debtor to file for
bankruptcy and receive all the benefits that automatically accompany such a
filing and then voluntarily escape once the debtor decides that filing for

242

See id.
In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d at 11.
244 See In re Withers, 2007 WL 628078, at *3.
245 Sabella, supra note 94, at 328.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 333.
248 Id. at 335.
249 Id. at 348–49. Contra Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren), 568 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009); In re
Parker, 351 B.R. 790, 800 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).
243
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bankruptcy is no longer to his advantage.250 It is alarming that so many
bankruptcy courts interpret § 521(i) as a hard and rigid mechanical deadline.
4. Limiting the Absolute Right to Dismissal Under § 521(i)
Courts realized the issues that an absolute right to automatic dismissal
creates and tried to remedy the situation by softening the textual approach and
reexamining congressional intent. These courts insist that cases are not in fact
automatically dismissed upon the mere passage of time.251 Instead, the
dismissal of a case requires proactive steps by a party-in-interest. The party
must move for dismissal and show that the requisite documents have not been
filed.252 The court in CFCU Community Credit Union v. Pierce noted:
Were 521(i)(1)’s automatic dismissal truly automatic, it would create
an odd result: if a bankrupt failed to comply with § 521(a)(1), but noone perceived the deficiency, discharge might still be granted, even
though—unbeknownst to anyone—the case had been dismissed.
Section 521(i)(2) adds to the confusion since it requires a court to file
an order for an automatic discharge. Yet if the discharge were truly
253
automatic, an order would be unnecessary.

In the case of In re Lopez, the court struggled to make sense of §§ 521(i)(1)
and 521(i)(2).254 Judge Leif M. Clark reasoned that if Congress truly intended
for the case in question to be automatically dismissed on the forty-sixth day, it
would have provided that “the case is dismissed effective on the [forty-sixth]
day.”255 In other provisions of the Code, “effective” is the word used by
Congress to express that an event occurs on its own without an order of the
court.256 Thus, a case should not be deemed dismissed unless a party-in-interest
moves to dismiss under § 521(i). This approach reconciles § 521(i)(2), which
states that “a [party-in-interest] may request the court to enter an order
250 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i) (2006); In re Warren, 568 F.3d at 1119; Segarra-Miranda v. Acosta-Rivera (In
re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009); In re Parker, 351 B.R. at 801; H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2
(2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
251 See In re Lopez, No. 09-31511-C, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3029, at *8 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2009);
In re Spencer, No. 06-00314, 2006 WL 3820702, at *2 (Bankr. D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2006).
252 In re Spencer, 2006 WL 3820702, at *2.
253 CFCU Cmty. Credit Union v. Pierce, No. 06-CV-6595-CJS, 2009 WL 2163107, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. July
17, 2009).
254 In re Lopez, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3029, at *1–9.
255 Id. at *3 (quoting In re Spencer, 388 B.R. at 423).
256 Id. Judge Martin Teel of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia cites examples in
§§ 362(h), 365(p)(1), 365(p)(3), 521(a)(6), and 551. “Presumably, Congress intended a different meaning
when it used the words ‘shall be automatically dismissed’ in § 521(i)(1).” In re Spencer, 388 B.R. at 423.

VALIUNAS GALLEYSFINAL2

2011]

12/13/2011 10:45 AM

ANYTHING BUT AUTOMATIC

263

dismissing the case.”257 Otherwise, if the case were automatically dismissed,
§ 521(i)(2) would have no meaning.258 Simply put, “if no one moves for an
order of dismissal pursuant to [§] 521(i), the case does not stand dismissed.
Instead, it proceeds . . . .”259 Thus, if a request is made by a party-in-interest,
the court has no choice other than to “dismiss a case upon a showing that the
specified events have occurred.”260 Only when a party-in-interest moves to
dismiss is the case “automatically” dismissed without the intervention of the
court.261
A bankruptcy court in the Southern District of Iowa used such reasoning
when it concluded that the court should not act sua sponte where no party-ininterest filed a § 521(i)(2) request for it to enter an order of dismissal.262 In In
re Jackson the debtor made an error and misnumbered his payment advices.263
As a result, he was one credit advice short on the forty-fifth day after filing the
petition and thus failed to satisfy § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv).264 The court issued an
order dismissing the case, and the debtor moved for reinstatement on the basis
of excusable neglect.265
Although the court reinstated the case, it was not on the basis of excusable
neglect.266 Rather, the court decided that it was time to abandon the current sua
sponte approach in favor of a stricter construction of § 521(i)(1).267 The stricter
construction requires a motion to dismiss by a party-in-interest pursuant to
§ 521(i)(2).268 In changing its interpretation of § 521, the court wanted to make
sure that the interpretation would not be construed in a manner that could lead
to absurd results.269 Thus, despite the “automatic” language in the statute, the
court decided that it should not dismiss the case sua sponte without a motion
257

In re Lopez, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3029, at *3 n.2.
Id. at *3 n.3. It also cannot be read as simply confirming the dismissal, since it would merely mirror
the language found in § 362(j), which states that “[o]n request of a party in interest, the court shall issue an
order under subsection (c) confirming that the automatic stay has been terminated.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(j) (2006).
259 In re Lopez, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3029, at *9.
260 Id. at *3.
261 Id. at *3–4.
262 In re Jackson, 348 B.R. 487, 500 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2006) (holding that where a debtor fails to timely
file required documents the case is deemed automatically dismissed on the forty-sixth day only if requested by
the party-in-interest).
263 Id. at 489.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id. at 489, 500.
267 Id. at 493.
268 Id. at 500.
269 Id. at 493.
258
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by a party-in-interest.270 The “automatic” language of § 521(i)(1) became
qualified by subparagraph (2), which requires a motion.271
Therefore, some courts believe that the “language should be construed to
mean that the court has no discretion but to dismiss a case upon a showing that
the specified events have occurred.”272 This means that the order itself
dismisses the case rather than confirming the dismissal.273 Although this
approach attempts to reconcile the confusing language of § 521, it barely
changes the potential for abuse by dishonest debtors.274 In a way, this approach
diminishes the meaning of “automatic.” The case is not dismissed
automatically, but rather someone has to initiate the dismissal so that the case
may be “automatically” dismissed. The courts in Lopez and Jackson merely
qualified the meaning of “automatic” so that other provisions, namely
§ 521(i)(2), could coexist with the rest of the statute.275 In doing so, a debtor
may still withhold information required by § 521(a)(1) and guarantee the
case’s dismissal as long as he, or another party-in-interest, brings it to the
court’s attention.276 The courts realized that by using a narrow reading of the
text in § 521, various sections of the same provision contradict each other.277 If
a narrow reading forces courts to qualify certain language in order to make the
statute usable, then there is clearly a lack of “plain meaning” and a textualist
approach to interpreting § 521(i) is not appropriate. An expansive approach

270

Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(1), (2) (2006).
272 In re Lopez, No. 09-31511-C, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3029, at *3 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Sept. 17, 2009); see
also In re Spencer, No. 06-00314, 2006 WL 3820702, at *2 (Bankr. D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2006) (holding dismissal
is effective upon order, otherwise provisions of § 521(i)(2), allowing dismissal on motion of party-in-interest,
would be moot). Contra In re Fawson, 338 B.R. 505, 511 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006) (“Section 521(i)(2) requires
an affirmative act from the Court but only upon request of a [party-in-interest.] This affirmative act does not
imply discretion not to dismiss the case, nor does this affirmative request change the legal effect of § 521(i)(1).
The debtor’s case is simply dismissed.”).
273 See In re Lopez, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3029, at *8; In re Jackson, 348 B.R. at 500.
274 The court in Jackson acknowledged that, as written, the statute can be taken advantage of:
271

[A] debtor who gambled on no one noticing an intentionally omitted payment advice could bring
the “exit bankruptcy wild card” to the attention of the Court after an unfavorable ruling on an
objection to exemption or on an objection to discharge. The trustee would not be able to counter
such a request with a motion brought under paragraph (4) because the trustee would not be able
to establish the debtor attempted in good faith to file the missing payment advice.
In re Jackson, 348 B.R. at 499.
275 In re Lopez, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3029, at *2–5; In re Jackson, 348 B.R. at 497–98.
276 In re Lopez, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3029, at *8; In re Jackson, 348 B.R. at 499.
277 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1), (i)(2) (2006); In re Jackson, 348 B.R. at 493.
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involving greater judicial discretion is necessary to overcome the problems that
an absolute right to dismissal presents.
B. Judicial Discretion to “Order Otherwise”
This Comment will now examine a small number of courts that realized
Congress did not intend an absolute right to dismissal and that a certain amount
of judicial discretion is necessary.278 This minority view, led by the First and
Ninth Circuits, looked not only at Congress’s intent, but also at the history of
the statute.279 Using their judicial discretion, the courts were able to interpret
the statute in various ways that follow through with Congress’s intent,
BAPCPA’s goals, and the tenets of bankruptcy.
Led by two circuit court decisions, a growing number of courts have moved
away from a strictly textual interpretation of the statute.280 These courts
realized that a plain meaning interpretation of § 521(i) is not readily apparent,
no matter how you qualify the text. This view holds that the court has judicial
discretion pursuant to § 521(a)(1) to “order otherwise” regarding the statutorily
required information after the forty-five day period has expired.281

278

See Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren), 568 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009); Segarra-Miranda v.
Acosta-Rivera (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2009); In re Withers, No. 06-42098 TM, 2007
WL 628078, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2007); In re Parker, 351 B.R. 790, 802 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).
279 See In re Warren, 568 F.3d at 1119; In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d at 14.
280 See In re Warren, 568 F.3d at 1119; In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d at 14; In re Withers, 2007 WL
628078, at *2; In re Parker, 351 B.R. at 802.
281 Section 521(a)(1) provides:
(a) The debtor shall—
(1) file—
(A) a list of creditors; and
(B) unless the court orders otherwise—
(i) a schedule of assets and liabilities;
(ii) a schedule of current income and current expenditures;
(iii) a statement of the debtor’s financial affairs and, if section 342(b) applies, a
certificate . . . ;
(iv) copies of all payment advices or other evidence of payment received within
60 days before the date of the filing of the petition, by the debtor from any
employer of the debtor;
(v) a statement of the amount of monthly net income, itemized to show how the
amount is calculated; and
(vi) a statement disclosing any reasonably anticipated increase in income or
expenditures over the 12-month period following the date of the filing of the
petition . . . .
11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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Textualists argue that under the canon expressio unius est exclusio
alterius282 the exclusion of “order otherwise” from the language of § 521(i),
despite its inclusion in § 521(a), means that the court cannot “order otherwise”
with regard to the forty-five day time limit of § 521(i). In other words, the
court is only allowed to “order otherwise” during the forty-five days following
the filing of a debtor’s petition. After that, the court must dismiss the case.283 It
is important to keep in mind that Congress must sometimes limit the language
as a compromise to get certain bills passed.284 Accordingly, Congress does not
always exclude language on purpose. Instead, one must look at legislative
intent for assistance in interpreting the law.
The judicial power to “order otherwise” in § 521 predates BAPCPA.285
When Congress amended § 521, it left the language intact.286 Some courts
regard such congressional silence with great deference.287 A recent decision
from the First Circuit “ordered otherwise” in an attempt to curb abusive
conduct.288 In In re Acosta-Rivera, a chapter 13 case was converted to a
chapter 7 case, after which the trustee proposed a settlement of a
discrimination suit that would have paid all of the debtor’s creditors in full and
provided a surplus to the debtors.289 The debtors had not originally scheduled
this cause of action, and they disclosed it at a later time in a second amendment
to their schedules.290 The debtors were not satisfied with the proposed
settlement and moved to dismiss, arguing that they failed to comply with the
requirements of § 521(a) within forty-five days.291
The First Circuit held that the bankruptcy court had discretionary authority
to waive the § 521(a) requirements because § 521(a)(1)(B) begins, “The debtor

282 A canon of negative implication meaning “the inclusion of one thing suggests the exclusion of all
others.” ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 119, at 263.
283 In re Hall, 368 B.R. 595, 599 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).
284 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 119, at 264.
285 See In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d at 12 n.6. The pre-BAPCPA version of § 521(1) provided that “[t]he
Debtor shall . . . file a list of creditors, and unless the court orders otherwise, a schedule of assets and
liabilities, a schedule of current income and current expenditures, and a statement of the debtor’s financial
affairs.” Id. at 12.
286 Id. at 12; see 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B).
287 See Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren), 568 F.3d 1113, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2009); In re Acosta-Rivera,
557 F.3d at 12.
288 See In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d at 14.
289 Id. at 10. Trustee’s proposal “would have satisfied all allowed claims; thus, neither the creditors nor
the trustee needed the missing . . . information.” Id. at 11.
290 Id. at 10.
291 Id.
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shall file [required documents] . . . unless the court orders otherwise . . . .”292
The court acknowledged that its reading of the statute would not always
decrease the number of bankruptcy filings, but was reluctant to interpret
BAPCPA’s limits on judicial discretion in a way “that would encourage rather
than discourage bankruptcy abuse.”293 Because the statutory language did not
clearly reflect this, an alternate interpretation was necessary. The court found
that “Congress, in enacting BAPCPA, was not bent on placing additional
weapons in the hands of abusive debtors.”294 A mechanical reading of the
statute failed to harmonize the purpose and intent of the statute.
The First Circuit observed that Congress intended for bankruptcy courts to
have discretion in determining whether any missing information is actually
required.295 If any of the required information was irrelevant or extraneous, the
court could “order otherwise” and deny the dismissal motion of a debtor’s
case.296 Thus, the court held that whenever “there is no continuing need for the
information or a waiver is needed to prevent automatic dismissal from
furthering a debtor’s abusive conduct, the court has discretion to take such an
action.”297 The use of the “order otherwise” clause allows the courts to use
some judicial discretion to recognize and deal with debtors who seek to
manipulate the bankruptcy proceedings.298
Adopting the First Circuit’s approach in Acosta-Rivera, the Ninth Circuit in
In re Warren held that the § 521 automatic dismissal may be waived after the
forty-five day deadline.299 After the chapter 7 trustee discovered potential
nonexempt assets, the debtor moved to voluntarily dismiss his own case in
order to avoid the freezing of a $93,000 bank account to pay for belated child
support.300 The debtor claimed that his case should be dismissed because he
had not timely filed the required payment advises.301

292

Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 13.
294 Id.
295 Id. at 14; see also In re Parker, 351 B.R. 790, 802 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006) (“It is the trustee and the
creditors who are in the best position to determine whether they have sufficient information to proceed.”).
296 In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d at 14.
297 Id. The ruling was not unlimited and the court stated explicitly that it was not deciding whether a
bankruptcy court had “unfettered discretion to waive the disclosure requirements ex post.” Id.
298 Id.
299 Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren), 568 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2009).
300 Id. at 1115.
301 Id. The debtor also argued that he had not obtained prepetition credit counseling and was thus
ineligible to be a debtor. Id.
293
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The court worried that the debtor wanted to get out of chapter 7 based on
his own failures and misconduct.302 The court acknowledged that although the
decision conflicted with the majority of other bankruptcy court decisions,303 it
nevertheless agreed with the First Circuit that “bankruptcy court[s] retain[]
discretion to waive the § 521(a)(1) filing requirement even after the § 521(i)(1)
filing deadline has passed.”304 Section 521(a)(1), which grants courts the
power to “order otherwise,” does not give the Court a timeline as to when it
must enter such an order.305 Also, nowhere in § 521(a)(1) does it state that
there is a time limit within which a court may “order otherwise.”306
One of the most important observations in Warren was that § 521(i)(1)’s
filing requirement is not directed at courts, but at debtors.307 Thus, the courts
are freed from limitations on their power and concrete statutory ambiguity is
established, allowing for alternative interpretations of § 521.308 The court
regarded with great deference Congress’s decision not to change § 521’s grant
of power to bankruptcy courts to “order otherwise.”309
Congressional silence in this regard was a confirmation that a strict
deadline was not appropriate and that it could not apply and limit the
bankruptcy court’s existing authority.310 Allowing otherwise would invite
frivolous filings because mere inaction by the debtor would be enough to
guarantee the dismissal of the case. According to the Ninth Circuit, such a
reading was consistent with Congress’s primary intent to limit abusive
bankruptcy filings.311
Another example of how the right amount of judicial discretion prevented
an abusive debtor from succeeding is Parker, from the bankruptcy court in the
Northern District of Georgia.312 After the chapter 7 trustee took action to sell

302

Id. at 1119.
The rulings in Warren and Acosta-Rivera have actually become the majority view among the circuit
courts, despite the numerous bankruptcy and district court cases following the absolute right to automatic
dismissal. Id.; Segarra-Miranda v. Acosta-Rivera (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2009).
304 In re Warren, 568 F.3d at 1117 (quoting In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d at 9).
305 Id.
306 Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1) (2006).
307 In re Warren, 568 F.3d at 1117.
308 Id.
309 Id. at 1113; see also Segarra-Miranda v. Acosta-Rivera, (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.
2009).
310 In re Warren, 568 F.3d at 1118.
311 Id.
312 In re Parker, 351 B.R. 790, 801 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).
303
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the debtor’s houseboat, the debtor claimed that the case was automatically
dismissed.313 The court “ordered otherwise” and denied the debtor’s motion to
dismiss after it concluded that it was not in the best interest of the creditors or
the estate to dismiss the case.314
Most importantly, the bankruptcy court in Parker found that dismissal
under § 521 was not a ministerial act and the court must review the docket and
enter an order of dismissal.315 The court noted, “A review of the docket will
not, for example, necessarily inform as to whether debtor received pay advices
during the requisite period.”316 It further found that since § 521(i) does not
dictate the time period in which the court can “order otherwise,” it could
excuse the filing requirements in a case at any time under appropriate
circumstances, before or after the forty-five day period pursuant to
§ 521(a)(1)(B).317 The court also noted that § 521(a) requires information, not
actual documents, thus making the court’s interpretation of § 521 even more
congruent with its holding.318 The exercise of judicial discretion and judgment
is necessary in order to determine whether the “information” required by
§ 521(a)(1) has been met.319 A certain amount of judicial discretion is
necessary to determine whether all the information required for the bankruptcy
proceedings was attained. The Honorable Keith M. Lundin noted that
“[i]nformation is a soft word that can’t be determined using a checklist of
documents that can or must be filed in a bankruptcy case.”320 The
determination itself acts as a gatekeeper, making sure that an honest debtor is
not penalized for minor technicalities. Likewise, it halts dishonest debtors
trying to escape bankruptcy proceedings when doing so is not in the best
interest of the creditors or the trustee.321
In coming to their conclusions, the courts that followed the “order
otherwise” premise focused not only on the intent of Congress in enacting

313 Id. at 799 (debtor claimed that the case was automatically dismissed after forty-five days because he
failed to file payment advices and to comply with the credit counseling certificate requirements of § 109(h)).
314 Id. at 802.
315 Id. at 801.
316 Id.
317 Id.
318 Id. at 800.
319 Segarra-Miranda v. Acosta-Rivera, (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2009).
320 Lundin, supra note 67, at 15.
321 See In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d at 14; In re Parker, 351 B.R. at 801.
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§ 521, but also on the history of the statute itself.322 The courts relied heavily
on the “order otherwise” language found in § 521(a)(1)(B):
The grant of judicial power to “order[] otherwise” predated
BAPCPA. In overhauling [§] 521, Congress left this familiar
language intact. We do not regard that as a mere fortuity. Nor do we
think that a slip of the pen accounts for the fact that the provision
does not now contain an explicit deadline for ordering otherwise. In
323
this context, we have a high regard for congressional silence.

Since a certain amount of flexibility existed before BAPCPA and postBAPCPA, one could reasonably infer that Congress intended for the judiciary
to retain some amount of power to respond to unforeseen constraints in the
statutory language.324 A basic principle of statutory interpretation is that courts
should consider, if possible, every clause and word of a statute, while avoiding
any construction that would suggest that the legislature was ignorant of the
meaning of the language it used.325 Thus, there is a “general presumption” that
“when Congress alters the words of a statute, it must intend to change the
statute’s meaning.”326 Although this reasoning is plausible, such an
interpretation heavily assumes that Congress means what it says and that any
statutory silence was purposefully intended. However, Congress cannot
directly and explicitly address every issue that may arise. One must look at the
broader picture to see what Congress tried to accomplish with the new
amendments to the Code. In this case, Congress’s main purpose in enacting
BAPCPA was to prevent abusive bankruptcy filings.327
Judicial discretion to “order otherwise” also solves the problem of honest
debtors having their cases dismissed due to accidental omissions in providing
the required information, such as payment advices.328 In In re Miller, the

322

See In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d at 12; In re Parker, 351 B.R. at 802.
In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d at 12.
324 See id.
325 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 119, at 254.
326 United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 336 (1992) (holding that the deletion of a reference to the
Attorney General in a statute was not significant because the reference “was simply lost in the shuffle” of a
comprehensive statutory revision that had various unrelated purposes); see also Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386,
397 (1995) (“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to have real and
substantial effect.”).
327 Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren), 568 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2009); see In re Acosta-Rivera, 557
F.3d at 13.
328 See Miller v. Cameron (In re Miller), 383 B.R. 767, 772–73 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008) (noting that very
strict and technical requirements unnecessarily burden an honest debtor and may preclude him from
bankruptcy).
323
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debtor failed to file one of four pay stubs.329 However, he filed a chart which
extrapolated the information on the missing pay stub.330 Additionally, the
fourth pay stub included all the year-to-date payment information.331 The
bankruptcy court had concluded, using a technical interpretation of the statute,
that the debtor failed to meet the requirements of § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) because he
never filed the third pay stub.332 The court reasoned that the statute required
the debtor to file copies of payment advices received directly from the
employer, or any other evidence of payment that was also received directly
from the employer.333 Thus, the information provided by the debtor did not
comply because it was not directly received from the employer, but rather
consisted of speculation by the debtor.334
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Tenth Circuit viewed that such a
hypertechnical application of the statutory code unnecessarily read additional
requirements into the statute.335 It concluded that § 521(a)(1)(B)(iv) allows the
debtor to file either payment advices or another form of evidence of payment,
which may include year-to-date payment information.336 The judge noted that
although the debtor’s chart was not created by the employer, the year-to-date
information provided was.337 The chart provided a simple mathematical
calculation by subtracting the fourth pay period amounts from the year-to-date
information.338 The bankruptcy court refused to consider the calculation due to
its hypertechnical reading of the statute.339 However, the appellate court took
into account that the necessary information, rather than the documents, was
submitted and that the debtor filed the extrapolated chart in good faith.340
Based on general principles of providing a bankruptcy procedure that allows
for discharge and a fresh start, the appellate court used its equitable powers to
refuse to automatically dismiss the case.341

329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341

Id. at 769.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 771.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 771.
Id. at 771–72.
Id. at 772.
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C. Reconciling § 521
The resolution for courts to “order otherwise” follows from multiple
analytical techniques of interpretation of § 521. Some courts reason that
§ 521(i) lacks plain meaning and thus judicial discretionary authority is needed
to interpret § 521(i) to reduce manipulation of the bankruptcy process. Other
courts support the view that when Congress’s intentions and purposes are
understood, the use of judicial discretionary authority in interpreting § 521(i)
may further the goals of BAPCPA. However, bankruptcy courts may have
equitable powers pursuant to § 105(a) to achieve proper results in making their
determinations.342
1. Section 105(a)—Powers of the Bankruptcy Court
As mentioned earlier, in Richardson, the court was asked to use its
equitable powers under § 105(a) to dismiss the debtor’s case with prejudice.343
However, the court noted that § 105(a) does not empower the court to: (1)
vacate a dismissal that has occurred automatically as prescribed by § 521(i)(1);
(2) alter the statutory penalty of § 521(i)(1); or (3) “judicially legislate
perceived shortcomings in existing law.”344 Section 105(a) states:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of
this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest
shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any
action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to
enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of
345
process.

At first glance, it seems that § 105(a) preserves judicial discretion and can be
used throughout the Code to enforce court orders and prevent the abuse of
bankruptcy proceedings.346 Thus, § 105(a) empowers a court to take action to
prevent an abuse of process.347 However, certain courts have warned that such
power has limitations.348 As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted,
342

See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 375 (2007).
In re Richardson, No. 07-42881, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 229 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2008); see 11
U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006).
344 In re Richardson, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 229, at *4 (citing In re Farrell, 241 B.R. 348, 349 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. 1999)).
345 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
346 See id.
347 See id.
348 See In re Brickey, 363 B.R. 59, 64 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2007).
343
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§ 105(a) provides “the power to exercise equity in carrying out the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code, rather than to further the purposes of the Code
generally, or otherwise to do the right thing.”349
In Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that bankruptcy courts may use § 105(a) to achieve a proper result in
making their decisions.350 Since Marrama, other courts have held that
bankruptcy courts may use § 105(a) to “achieve a result that the Code clearly
required.”351 So what is preventing courts from using their judicial discretion
with § 105(a) to deal with § 521(i)?352 Perhaps it is the fear that using § 105(a)
to limit “automatic dismissal” would constitute judicial activism.353 But what if
§ 521(i) is simply inconsistent as written? In that case, it would be better if the
courts were aware of discrepancies and subordinated their judgment and
discretion to the broader purposes of BAPCPA and bankruptcy law in general.
That way there would be a consistent body of law, rather than various judicial
loopholes through which judges have to jump to get the equitable result that
BAPCPA intended.
2. Proposed Solutions
Certain possible solutions exist at multiple levels of bankruptcy
proceedings, with the ultimate solution being a change in the statutory
language. The perplexing concept of automatic dismissal lacks the requirement
that bankruptcy courts enter orders. As Judge Lundin noted, “[I]t suggests just
the opposite—that something has happened in a bankruptcy case that does not
require court action.”354 All solutions proposed here involve halting abusive
debtors from escaping bankruptcy proceedings at will, while still maintaining
Congress’s wish for reduced filings.355
The most immediate solution can be implemented by the judges
themselves, which includes following the First and Ninth Circuits whenever
349 Smart World Tech., LLC v. Juno Online Serv., Inc. (In re Smart World), 423 F.3d 166, 184 (2d Cir.
2005) (quoting New England Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart), 351 F.3d
86, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2003)).
350 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 382 (2007).
351 Perez v. Peake, 373 B.R. 468, 488 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
352 See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i).
353 In re Ott, 343 B.R. 264, 267 n.7 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006) (“The court . . . must be careful in exercising
any power, on its own initiative, under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), to extend the time limits and ‘automatic’ operation
of 11 U.S.C. § 521(i) so as to refrain from impermissible ‘judicial activism.’”).
354 LUNDIN & BROWN, supra note 80, § 388.1[23].
355 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
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dealing with the complex implications of § 521.356 Although the use of judicial
discretionary authority to “order otherwise” in these opinions is not perfect, it
provides the best immediate method for dealing with the unclear and
contradicting language of § 521(i).357 This reasoning prevents dishonest
debtors from abusing the bankruptcy proceedings and diminishes the
application of invisible administrative provisions while retaining BAPCPA’s
intent of ejecting debtors who were actually not fully prepared for bankruptcy
proceedings.
In some jurisdictions, local rules allow for a different solution. Some local
rules permit a debtor to file a “certificate of compliance,” which affirms that
the information required by § 521(a)(1) was filed within the forty-five days
required by § 521(i).358 Once the certificate is filed, “a rebuttable presumption
arises . . . that automatic dismissal is not appropriate under § 521(i). A party
that disagrees can overcome the presumption after notice and a hearing in the
bankruptcy court.”359 Because the rule requires a hearing, the issues presented
by § 521(i) are reviewed by bankruptcy judges rather than automatically
dismissed. The fact that some courts have implemented such a solution
insinuates that § 521(i) does indeed need judicial attention, rather than
invisible administrative process.360
Similarly, other courts, such as the U.S. Bankruptcy Court of Northern
District of Georgia, provide a waiver clause with the form confirming the
bankruptcy plan. Specifically, the form states:
Because no party in interest has filed a request for an order of
dismissal pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(i)(2) and because the parties in
interest should not be subjected to any uncertainty as to whether this
case is subject to automatic dismissal under § 521(i)(1), Debtor is not
required to file any further document pursuant to § 521(a)(1)(B) to
avoid an automatic dismissal and this case is not and was not subject
to automatic dismissal under § 521(i)(1).361

356 See generally Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren), 568 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2009); Segarra-Miranda v.
Acosta-Rivera (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009).
357 See, e.g., In re Warren, 568 F.3d 1113; In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d 8; see also 11 U.S.C. § 531(i).
358 LUNDIN & BROWN, supra note 80, § 388.1[22].
359 Id.
360 Id. at § 388.1[23].
361 E.g., Order That this Case is Not Subject to Dismissal Under 521(i)(1), In re Riddle, No. 11-40013pwb (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2011).
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Although the form tries to remedy the problems that § 521(i) creates, by the
time the plan is created and the form is issued, it may be too late. If a dishonest
debtor keeps track of the deadlines, the debtor may nevertheless have already
filed a motion for dismissal.362
The difficulties that arise in interpreting § 521 could be resolved if
Congress were to amend the Code. Section 521(i) should be amended to
provide some judicial involvement so that an entry of a court order by a partyin-interest would only be possible after an opportunity for a hearing.363 Such a
change would prevent dishonest debtors from taking advantage of the
bankruptcy proceedings while fulfilling Congress’s intention to remove
debtors who fail to fulfill the disclosure obligations.
3. Due Process Concerns
Automatic dismissal may not make sense or be required to accomplish the
goals of BAPCPA.364 The concept of “automatic” raises many concerns as
discussed above. The court in Fawson spelled out some of these concerns:
If the case were not dismissed under § 521(i)(1) until a [party-ininterest] made a § 521(i)(2) request, then what effect would the
automatic dismissal language of § 521(i)(1) have? None. The same
absurd result would occur were the Court to find that the phrase
“Subject to paragraphs (2) and (4)” found at the beginning of
§ 521(i)(1) required that the Court wait until a [party-in-interest] filed
a § 521(i)(2) request before dismissing a case. Were this the intended
procedure, courts would have cases languishing on their dockets that
were “effectively dismissed” on the [forty-sixth] day. But trustees
might continue to administer the case because everyone is awaiting a
§ 521(i)(2) request. Such an absurd result could not have been what
365
Congress intended.

In addition to the aforementioned problems, the fact that a case can be
dismissed automatically raises due process concerns.366 If a case is truly
automatically dismissed because of § 521(i)(1), then it was done so without a
court order. That means that there was no judicial determination that the debtor
has, in fact, failed to file those documents.367 An issue arises in this case
362
363
364
365
366
367

See 11 U.S.C. § 521(i) (2006).
In re Lopez, No. 09-31511-C, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3029, at *7 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Sep. 17, 2009).
See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
In re Fawson, 338 B.R. 505, 511 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006).
LUNDIN & BROWN, supra note 80, § 388.1[8].
Id.; see also Lundin, supra note 67, at 15.
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because there is no way for a trustee, or even a debtor, to move for a
reconsideration of the automatic dismissal. How would any party-in-interest
know that the case had been dismissed? This raises due process concerns.368
However, courts have been reluctant to deal with this issue and have either
failed to dismiss the case or not addressed the due process issue.369
Section 521(e)(2)(B) provides that “the court shall dismiss the case unless
the debtor demonstrates that the failure to [provide required tax returns] is due
to circumstances beyond the control of the debtor.”370 It is unclear why
Congress chose a qualified dismissal in the context of tax returns rather than an
automatic dismissal as described by § 521(i). Perhaps the difference between
payment advices and tax returns is significant enough that each deserve a
different treatment in dismissal.371 Either way, such due process concerns
affect every debtor who is going through bankruptcy. A strict and rigid
application of § 521(i) requirements leads to unfavorable outcomes and
potential constitutional concerns for honest debtors while allowing dishonest
debtors to manipulate the system. Ideally, changing the statutory text to require
a judicial order to dismiss a case would address due process concerns, but
allowing some judicial discretion also helps to promote the values of BAPCPA
and bankruptcy law in general.
CONCLUSION
Many courts rely on legislative history when examining the meaning of the
statute. However, at least one court found, and commentators agree, that
legislative history is not available for certain parts of the Code.372 Barely any
Senate or conference reports exist on BAPCPA which courts could use to
identify congressional intent.373 Also, the House Report is not instructive

368

See In re Lopez, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3029, at *7.
See Miller v. Cameron (In re Miller), 383 B.R. 767, 772 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2008); In re Lopez, 2009
Bankr. LEXIS 3029, at *6.
370 11 U.S.C. § 521(e)(2)(B) (2006).
371 Maybe the two provisions were written by different groups; a tax group wrote the tax provision and a
creditor group wrote the pay stub provision. Due to a lack of legislative history, it is hard to tell. See In re
Nance, 371 B.R. 358, 366 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007); Thomas F. Waldron & Neil M. Berman, Principled
Principles of Statutory Interpretation: A Judicial Perspective After Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 195, 217 (2007).
372 See In re Nance, 371 B.R. at 366 (“The legislative history regarding the proper calculation of projected
disposable income is virtually non-existent.”).
373 Id.; Waldron & Berman, supra note 370, at 217 (“[T]here is no joint conference committee report, . . .
no Senate Judiciary Committee Report, . . . no floor statements from the floor managers that might be
369
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regarding Congress’s intent and merely tracks the language of BAPCPA.374
Since BAPCPA’s legislative history is thin, the intent of the legislation is often
unclear.375
Thus, it is no surprise that many courts choose to rely on a textual approach
to interpret § 521(i).376 Such an interpretation establishes an absolute right to
dismissal which invites potential abuse of the bankruptcy system.377 Curiously,
a textualist interpretation also creates hardships for honest, but perhaps
unfortunate debtors, who forget to file one piece of documentation.378 The
main purpose of the Code is to provide a procedure by which honest
consumers are entitled to a bankruptcy discharge and a fresh start.379 Through
bankruptcy, these honest debtors can “reorder their affairs, make peace with
their creditors, and enjoy ‘a new opportunity in life.’”380 However, a technical
application of the Code does not limit such opportunity to the “honest but
unfortunate debtor.”381 Instead, it opens up a safety hatch for a dishonest
debtor who seeks to use the Code to his own unfair advantage.
In enacting BAPCPA, Congress stated that “[t]he purpose of the bill is to
improve bankruptcy law and practice by restoring personal responsibility and
integrity in the bankruptcy system and ensure that the system is fair for both
debtors and creditors.”382 Thus, in support of creditor interests, BAPCPA was
meant to “respond to many of the factors contributing to the increase in
consumer bankruptcy filings, such as lack of personal financial accountability,
the proliferation of serial filings, and the absence of effective oversight to
eliminate abuse in the system.”383 Indeed, Congress passed BAPCPA in
response to the growing number of filings in cases of abuse of bankruptcy
considered akin to a conference committee report or even consistent Senate and House committee reports to
consult.”).
374 In re Nance, 371 B.R. at 366; Waldron & Berman, supra note 370, at 217 (“[T]he House Judiciary
Committee Report is often a mere repetition of the text of BAPCPA.”).
375 See Braucher, supra note 42, at 97.
376 See, e.g., In re Richardson, No. 07-42881, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 229, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Jan. 30,
2008); In re Hall, 368 B.R. 595, 602 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).
377 See, e.g., In re Richardson, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 229, at *6.
378 In re Catania, 397 B.R. 667, 670 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2008); In re Scalise, No. 08-61739, 2008 Bankr.
LEXIS 2983, at *5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2008); see also Sabella, supra note 94, at 333.
379 See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (“The principal purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’” (citing Grogan v. Garner,
498 U.S. 279, 286, 287 (1991))).
380 Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286 (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
381 Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367.
382 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 2 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 89.
383 See id.
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procedures by dishonest debtors.384 Section 521 was meant to directly address
these issues.385
In theory, an automatic dismissal by § 521(i) would decrease the number of
cases that the courts must hear if the debtor was not fully prepared to file his
bankruptcy case. This would prepare the bankruptcy courts only for those
debtors who truly are ready to seek a fresh start. It would also force debtors
and their attorneys to be more meticulous about their filings.386 Everything was
meant to be mechanical in nature, thus minimizing a court’s interference and
overall discretionary authority. However, limiting the bankruptcy courts’
discretionary authority in § 521(a)(1) encourages bankruptcy abuse. An
abusive and manipulative debtor can easily have his case automatically
dismissed by declining to comply with the § 521(a)(1) filing requirement.387 In
contrast, allowing bankruptcy courts the discretion to waive the § 521(a)(1)
filing requirement even after the filing deadline has passed discourages abusive
bankruptcy filings.388 Using its discretionary authority, the court may decline
to dismiss the debtor’s case if it determines that the debtor is abusing and
manipulating the bankruptcy system.389 Thus, because § 521(i) lacks a single
plain meaning, the use of judicial discretionary authority in interpreting
§ 521(i) reduces manipulation of the bankruptcy process and furthers the goals
of BAPCPA.
Hopefully, the circuit court decisions in Acosta-Rivera and Warren will
provide an appropriate template for other bankruptcy courts to use. Although
this method is not perfect, the use of judicial discretionary authority to “order
otherwise” is the best method currently available for dealing with the unclear
and contradicting language of § 521(i). The best solution would be for
Congress to rewrite that particular Code section to require an automatic
hearing for dismissal, rather than allowing for a sua sponte dismissal.

384
385
386
387
388
389

See id.
See id.
See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 60, ¶ 521.03.
Wirum v. Warren (In re Warren), 568 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir. 2009).
See, e.g., id.; Segarra-Miranda v. Acosta-Rivera (In re Acosta-Rivera), 557 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir. 2009).
See, e.g., In re Warren, 568 F.3d at 1118; In re Acosta-Rivera, 557 F.3d at 14.
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Rewriting the section would eliminate due process issues and allow courts to
deal with unique and unforeseen circumstances on a case-by-case basis.
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